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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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The two most enduring contemporaneous accounts of the interwar period 
are E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis and Karl Polanyi's The Great 
Transformation.1 The perspectives from which the two authors wrote could 
barely have differed more. Carr is best remembered today for pulverizing the 
idealist foundations of liberal internationalism and preparing the ground, 
thereby, for the postwar ascendancy of realist discourse in the academic study 
of international relations. Polanyi's intellectual pedigree and legacy are more 
complex. He delivered a searing indictment of the social destructiveness of un­
regulated market forces and the moral mutilation of market rationality. For 
these views, Polanyi was later adopted by the new left. But he anchored his 
critique in an organic conception of society that was, in fact, deeply conserva­
tive in the traditionalist sense of that term.
Despite their differences, Carr and Polanyi reached similar conclusions 
about the future of the world economy. Both believed they had witnessed, in 
Polanyi's words, "the passing of capitalist internationalism," or, as Carr de­
picted it, the "abnormal, laissez-faire interlude of the nineteenth century."1 2 
And both felt that the drive to reimpose social and political imperatives on the 
self-regulating market which had swept the industrialized countries in the 
1930s would be extended into the international arena after the war. 
"Internationally," Carr felt, "the consequences of absolute laissez-faire are as 
fantastic and as unacceptable as are the consequences of laissez-faire within the 
state."3 Polanyi concurred. "Out of the ruins of the Old World, the corner­
stones of the New can be seen to emerge: economic collaboration of govern­
ments and the liberty to organize national life at will."4
For nearly a half century, the economic collaboration of governments that 
Carr and Polanyi foresaw has been pursued within a form of multilateralism 
consistent with the maintenance of domestic stability -  what I have elsewhere 
called the embedded liberalism compromise.5 Societies were asked to embrace 
the change and dislocation attending international liberalization. But liberal­
1 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study o f International Relations (1939; New York: Harper & Row, 1964), and Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time 
(1944; Boston: Beacon Books, 1957).
2 Polanyi, p. 248; Carr, p. 116.
3 Carr, p. 121.
4 Polanyi, pp. 253-254, italics in original.
5 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 





























































































ization and its effects were constrained, in turn, by the newly acquired domes­
tic policy roles of governments. Part I summarizes the nature of this 
compromise in the domain of international trade, and traces its evolution to 
the present I argue that, with some exceptions, the compromise has held up 
remarkably well, notwithstanding criticism to the contrary that typically fo­
cuses on the practices of the so-called new protectionism.
In part due to the success of this postwar arrangement, capital has become 
globally more mobile as well as more transnationalized in organiza-tion and 
integrated in scope than Carr or Polanyi could ever have imagined. We are, 
therefore, entering an entirely new era in the evolution of the world economy. 
Part II develops a schematic and provisional formulation of this new world 
economy's key institutional features. I argue that one of their generic conse­
quences is the growing "disembeddedness" of international economic forces 
from the institutional frameworks and policy instruments governments have 
been employing to buffer the pursuit of domestic economic and social objec­
tives. Some observers may find this outcome "fantastic" in the positive sense of 
the word, because of its presumed global efficiency and welfare effects. But it 
could end up being "fantastic" as Carr meant it: fanciful, due to doubts about 
its domestic political viability.
In neither story do I find the widespread tendency to view the behavior of 
governments through the lenses of free trade vs. protectionism to be particu­
larly helpful. In the first, the lenses distort and exaggerate the dangers of pro­
tectionism. In the second, they misconstrue the nature of the problem alto­
gether. Throughout, therefore, the attempt is made to correct for these lenses 
and to provide a more grounded and less of a textbook view of the political 
economy of international trade. Finally, telling both stories from the vantage 
point of the United States draws attention to a potentially key difference be­
tween postwar efforts at institutional reconstruction and the current need to 
adapt and reconfigure what was then created: the ability and willingness of the 
U.S. to act in support of the international economic order.
In short, the world in 1995 finds itself faced with a challenge which in some 
respects is not unlike the one it faced in 1945: devising a form of international 
liberalization that is consistent with domestic economic and social stability. 
Deepening our understanding of the earlier effort may shed some guiding light 





























































































Efforts to reconstruct the postwar international economic order began amid 
raging world war, coupled with painful memories of the Great Depression, 
beggar-thy-neighbor trade and monetary policies, and outright economic war­
fare. Understandably, the reconstruction reflected, above all, a quest for nor­
malcy, a search for stability. "Historians often treat stability as a passive com­
ing to rest or a societal inertia that requires no explanation," Charles Maier 
has written. "In fact, stabilization is as challenging a historical problem as 
revolution."6 The challenge was especially acute for the architects of the post­
war economic order because they were obliged to reconcile two dimensions of 
stabilization that history had shown to stand in contradiction.
The United States sought to create an open and nondiscriminatory interna­
tional economic order. But a mere return to the gold standard and free trade 
was rejected on the grounds that they would destabilize domestic employment 
and social welfare objectives. Harry Dexter White, who drafted the U.S. plan 
for the postwar monetary regime, dismissed them as "harmful hangovers from 
a nineteenth century creed."7 At the same time, the uncoordinated pursuit of 
domestic stabilization was rejected because it had triggered the mutually de­
structive spirals of the 1930s, thereby showing itself to be incompatible with 
international openness and nondiscrimination. This tension between the re­
quirements of international and domestic stability was resolved by means of 
the heterodox institutional formula of "embedded liberalism." Unlike the eco­
nomic nationalism of the thirties, the inter-national economic order would be 
multilateral in character. But unlike the laissez-faire liberalism of the gold 
standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon the in­
terventionist character of the modern capitalist state. Finally, the forms of 
domestic intervention were expected to be broadly compatible with economic 
openness and expansion.
Stability was achieved in due course and a period of unprecedented eco­
nomic expansion ensued. The cold war, far from being an impediment to insti­
tuting the multilateral economic order, facilitated it. The socialist countries 
dropped out early on, making it easier to devise and implement multilateral
6 Charles S. Maier, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth- 
Century Western Europe," American Historical Review, 86 (April 1981), p. 327. I 
should point out that both Maier and I use the term stabilization in the broad sense of 
restoring a sustainable institutional order in domestic and international economic relations 
-  not the narrower technical sense of macroeconomic stabilization policies as used by the 
International Monetary Fund.
7 In the 1942 draft of the plan, as cited by G. John Ikenberry, "A World Economy 
Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Settlement," International 




























































































monetary and trade regimes. And bipolarity made it easier for the Western 
capitalist countries to compromise and make sacrifices for the sake of their 
common front against the communist East.8 Even before the collapse of the 
communist system, several of its constituent states sought entry into the multi­
lateral economic regimes. Since 1989, almost all the rest have done so, as have 
most of the developing countries, making these the first economic regimes in 
history to achieve virtual universality.
And yet, for over twenty years now serious observers have detected a "dis­
astrous isolationist trend" in U.S. foreign economic policy, as the well-known 
economic policy analyst Fred Bergsten characterized it as early as 1972. 
Bergsten predicted deleterious consequences for the international economic 
order; warned of "the first real international trade war since the 1930s;" and 
reminded us that "trade wars could become full economic wars, precisely as 
they did under similar international conditions in the 1930s."9 A decade later, 
it was Robert Reich's turn to alert the world to the "collapse of free-trade 
ideology into retaliatory protectionism."10 Similar concerns abound today.11
Clearly, something is amiss, either in the world of economic policy or in the 
perspectives that many observers have brought to bear on it. Successful ex­
pansion and imminent disaster do not as a rule simultaneously describe the 
same phenomenon. One key problem, in fact, is that analysts frequently have 
misunderstood or ignored actual institutional designs and frameworks, judging 
the behavior of governments instead by theoretical maxims or even ideological 
preferences. Peter Kenen confessed as much some time ago in the context of 
international monetary reforms: "Without always knowing, most of us have 
judged events, decisions, and proposals by an idealistic, cosmopolitan crite­
rion. We have asked how far each step has taken us toward the creation of a
8 The "security externalities” of trade policy within bipolar systems are demonstrated deftly 
by Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science 
Review, 83 (December 1989); and Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, "Power Politics 
and International Trade," American Political Science Review, 87 (June 1993).
9 These citations are from C. Fred Bergsten, "The New Economics and U.S. Foreign 
Policy," Foreign Affairs, 50 (January 1972), assessing the implications the 1971 Nixon- 
Connally shifts in U.S. international economic policy (closing the gold window, 
imposing a temporary import surcharge). International trade lawyers shared the sense of 
alarm in the 1970s; see Robert E. Hudec, "Retaliation Against 'Unreasonable' Foreign 
Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment," 
Minnesota Law Review, 59 (No. 3, 1975).
10 Robert B. Reich, "Beyond Free Trade,” Foreign Affairs, 61 (Spring 1983), p. 774.
11 For sophisticated variants, see Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. 
Patrick, eds., Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World 
Trading System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). Also see "Echoes of 




























































































world money to which national monies would be subordi-nated and by which 
they might some day be supplanted."12 At the level of global monetary rela­
tions, however, governments have shown little desire to move in any such 
"cosmopolitan" direction.13 Robert Aliber characterizes a second common 
tendency as the willingness by commentators to "risk sacrificing the state to 
save the constitution" -  that is, to expect governments to adhere rigidly to 
rules, no matter what the conditions and no matter what the consequences, 
even when viable and apparently acceptable alternatives exist.14 Governments 
have not eagerly followed that course. The effects of these mindsets are com­
pounded in assessments of the trade regime by the emotive appeal of free-trade 
ideology among economists and of the written text by international legal 
scholars.
Our first task, then, is to sketch out the basic institutional framework -  the 
principled and shared understandings by which the capitalist countries sought 
to come to grips with the twin desires of domestic and international economic 
stability in their trade relations at the outset of the postwar era. Only then can 
we discern which practices constitute serious deviation from the norm today, 
and where fundamental problems reside. The present section comprises two 
parts. First, I summarize the central features of the embedded liberalism com­
promise in the postwar trade regime. Then I examine the most significant 
trade policy practices by governments today which are often characterized as 
being incompatible with postwar norms. Predictably, one of the main reasons 
for deviations from past practice is the fact that the United States has devel­
oped a more strategic orientation to its trade policy as a result of the resur­
gence of Europe and Japan, as well as the emergence of entirely new entrants 
in the tournament of major economic players. From the heterodox vantage of 
embedded liberalism, however, many of the deviations from past practice do 
not seem quite as problematical as they do from more conventional points of 
view. The trade regime is not in danger of imminent collapse as a result of 
policy practices by the major capitalist economies vis-à-vis one another.
12 Peter Kenan, "An Overall View," in Fabio Basagni, ed., International Monetary 
Relations After Jamaica (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1976), p. 
7.
13 The European Union is an exception to this generalization. Because this monograph 
focuses on the posture of the United States vis-à-vis the global trade regime, 
developments in the EU are referred to only in passing.
14 Robert Z. Aliber, "Fixed Exchange Rates and the Rate of Inflation," in Colin D. 
Campbell and William R. Dougan, eds., Alternative Monetary Regimes (Baltimore: 




























































































Embedded Liberalism in Trade
Once negotiations on postwar commercial arrangements got under way seri­
ously, in the context of an International Conference on Trade and 
Employment, the principles of multilateralism and tariff reduction were af­
firmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, and restrictions -  all 
designed to protect the balance of payments and a variety of domestic social 
policies.15 The proposed charter for an all-encompassing International Trade 
Organization (ITO) became internally so inconsistent that it is difficult to say 
what sort of regime it would have given rise to. In any case, the U.S. Senate 
refused the ratify the charter, it being too intrusive for some and not activist 
enough for others. As a result, traditional and less controversial concerns of 
commercial policy -  tariffs, quotas, and the like -  were incorporated into a 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which the United States 
helped form upon the ITO's demise and which it joined by executive order.16 
A far smaller domain of commercial relations thereby became subject to the 
trade regime than would have been the case otherwise. Among the most im­
portant exclusions were the regulation of commodity markets, restrictive busi­
ness practices, and international investments. The fact that multilateral rules 
for these domains were not created came to pose major problems for the trade 
regime in later years, as we shall see in the next section.
The GATT made obligatory the most-favored-nation rule, but a blanket ex­
ception had to be allowed for all existing preferential agreements (a U.S. con­
cession to Britain), and countries were permitted to form customs unions and 
free trade areas (U.S. encouragement to Western Europe). Moreover, quanti­
tative import restrictions were prohibited, but were deemed suitable measures 
for safeguarding the balance of payments -  explicitly including payments dif­
ficulties that resulted from domestic full employment policies. They could also 
be invoked in agricultural trade if used in conjunction with a domestic price 
support program. The substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade was called for, but it was not made obligatory and was coupled with ap­
propriate emergency actions which were allowed if domestic producers were 
threatened with injury from import competition that was due to past tariff
15 The United States, led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, initially had pursued a more 
orthodox free-trade line. Opposition to it was universal abroad and nearly so among New 
Dealers at home. The split was resolved by delaying the trade negotiations until the 
monetary agreement was concluded -  and Hull had retired. Ikenberry picks up the story: 
"After the Treasury group succeeded in reaching an agreement with the British on 
postwar monetary arrangements, the State Department found its nineteenth-century style 
trade proposals essentially incompatible with these agreements" and fell into line. 
Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored," p. 310.
16 The classic study remains William Diebold, Jr., "The End of the ITO," Princeton Essays 




























































































concessions. The Agreement also offered a blanket escape from any of its 
obligations provided that two-thirds of the contracting parties approved -  in 
1955 the United States availed itself of this opportunity to exclude its agricul­
tural adjustment program from international scrutiny. Lastly, procedures were 
provided to settle disputes arising under the Agreement and for the 
multilateral surveillance of the invocation of most (though not all) of its escape 
clauses. The principle of reciprocity was enshrined as a code of conduct, to 
guide both tariff reductions and the determination of compensation for injuries 
suffered.
The efforts to construct multilateral economic regimes did not come to 
fruition until the late 1950s. Only then had European leaders acquired the 
confidence to undertake the process of liberalization beyond Europe itself. The 
European Economic Community had been formed, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agreements became fully operational, and GATT negotiations be­
gan the process that would virtually eliminate tariff barriers to trade and make 
possible the most sustained period of economic growth ever. Getting from 
"here to there" required substantial doses of U.S. financial assistance, security 
assistance, and deliberate discriminatary monetary and trade practices by 
Western Europe against the United States so as to promote intra-European lib­
eralization. The United States also intervened more directly in the domestic 
polities of other countries, through the occupation authorities in Germany and 
Japan, and through such transnational adjuncts of American civil society as the 
American Federation of Labor, which was particularly active in France, Italy, 
and Latin America. The U.S. sought, thereby, to moderate the structure and 
ideological direction of political movements, to encourage the exclusion of 
communist parties from participation in governments, and generally to keep 
collectivist impulses within acceptable center-left bounds.17 Finally, in order 
to persuade the Europeans to admit Japan into the GATT in the mid-1950s, the 
United States permitted them to phase in Japan's access to their markets while 
opening its own market to Japanese goods immediately.
In the process of getting from here to there, the monetary and trade regimes 
lost the universalism that would have been provided by socialist membership, 
European and Japanese particularisms were encouraged for the sake of U.S. 
and allied security objectives, and policies toward the emerging third world 
became shaped by cold war rivalry.
17 See Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins o f the Cold War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985); Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction o f Western 
Europe, 1945-1951 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); 
Maier, "The Two Postwar Eras;" and Stephen A. Schuker, "Comments on Maier," 




























































































Discontinuities or Adaptive Change?
As a result of successive rounds of GATT reductions, tariff levels have been 
lowered to the point of no longer constituting a barrier to international trade: 
barely 5 percent on industrial products, down from an average of over 40 per­
cent in the immediate postwar years. As a result, exclusive preferences also 
became irrelevant, though generalized preferences for developing countries 
are in place by international agreement.18 Growth in world trade has averaged 
in excess of 5 percent per annum throughout the postwar period and continues 
to outpace growth in world output. During the 1980s, Latin America and 
Africa were engaged in a decade-long struggle against debt, inflation, stagna­
tion, and capital flight. But overall exports from the developing countries 
continued to rise, and Latin America has since recovered. Moreover, many 
developing countries that had stayed out of the GATT, preferring the more 
statist orientation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), have now joined. The former socialist countries uniformly have 
turned their backs on over forty years of central planning and now seek inte­
gration into the world economy. Lastly, the GATT's Uruguay Round, the first 
to venture into the uncharted terrain of services, intellectual property rights, 
and agriculture produced an agreement and proposed the creation of a World 
Trade Organization (WTO), which would have a considerably greater capacity 
than GATT for dealing with recent trade policy problems.19
Few observers question the significance of these accomplishments. But many 
have challenged their sustainability in the face of the forces of the so-called 
new protectionism, in particular various forms of nontariff barriers imposed 
by the leading industrialized countries on imports from one another and from 
the newly industrializing countries. The United States is usually indicted as a 
chief culprit.
18 Because of its common external tariff and its special relations with a group of Asian- 
Pacific-Caribbean developing countries, this generalization does not hold fully for the 
European Union. As Martin Wolf has put it, the EU "is not only itself a discriminatory 
trading arrangement, if looked at as a collection of separate countries, but is embedded in 
concentric circles of discrimination," consisting of a variety of preferences and restraints. 
Wolf, "The European Community and the Developing Countries in the International 
Trading System," Aussenwirtschaft, 42, Heft 1 (1987), pp. 56-57. These exceptions are 
perfectly acceptable under existing rules of the game, and make relatively little practical 
difference to the overall trading system besides.
19 At the time of writing, the ratification process for the Uruguay Round has yet to begin, 
hence it is too soon to tell in what forms the new proposals will be enacted and how they 
will function. One early analysis of the agreement that I have found very useful and draw 
on below is John M. Curtis and Robert Wolfe, "Nothing is Agreed Until Everything is 
Agreed: First Thoughts on the Implications of the Uruguay Round," in Maureen Appel 
Molot and Harald von Riekoff, eds., A Part of the Peace: Canada Among Nations, 1994- 




























































































The particulars regarding the so-called new protectionism on the part of the 
United States are not in dispute. The primary referent is various forms of 
administered and negotiated nontariff barriers to imports, above all escape 
clause relief, antidumping and countervailing duty actions, and voluntary ex­
port restraints. What is at issue is what these practices signify. The first two 
have explicit legal bases in GATT, though their implementation may deviate in 
specific instances. The last is nowhere mentioned in GATT, but that fact alone 
does not make it incompatible with GATT norms. The incidence of these mea­
sures has increased substantially over the years, especially in the 1980s, but so 
did trade liberalization. Even when these practices are not abused they reduce 
trade flows below what their levels would be in an unrestricted commercial 
world, but neither the U.S. government nor any other has ever agreed to live 
in such a world. In addition to "process protectionism," some observers have 
also expressed concern about a resurgence of "legislated protectionism" by 
Congress, pushing the executive branch to pursue tougher unilateral trade 
remedies.20 Yet Congress, at the same time, has refrained from reclaiming the 
full trade policy powers it first started to delegate to the executive in the-mid 
1930s -  largely to facilitate liberalization, as well as to protect itself from 
protectionist pressures. In short, we find ourselves in the messy business of 
interpretation. The institutional framework of embedded liberalism, not text­
book orthodoxies, serves as our baseline.
The "New Protectionism"
Serious tariff reductions began with the GATT's Kennedy Round in the 
1960s. There is considerable evidence that, right from the start, movement 
toward greater economic openness in the OECD countries has been closely as­
sociated with governments expanding their domestic role to manage the ad­
justment costs. What is more, openness overrides virtually all other economic 
and political factors in explaining governments' active policy roles -  including 
economic size, level of affluence, rate of unemployment and the presence of 
left-wing parties in the electoral system.21 Lastly, as one such study con­
cluded, governments on the whole "merely attempt to mitigate the negative ef­
fects of trade liberalization on specific industries and not to offset them en­
tirely."22 Though governments had never defined a precise metric, in terms of
20 The terms process and legislated protectionism are employed by I.M. Destler in what has 
become the standard study of U.S. trade policy, American Trade Politics, 2nd. edition 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992), chap. 6.
21 David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," 
American Political Science Review, 72, No. 4 (December 1978), p. 1254, may have 
been the first study to demonstrate this relationship statistically.
22 André Blais, "The Political Economy of Public Subsidies," Comparative Political 




























































































the overall balance of international and domestic objectives, as we have seen, 
this is more or less how the trade regime was expected to function.
The United States differs from other industrialized countries in its size, the 
relatively modest share of trade in its national product, and the more liberal 
character of its state. Accordingly, it has relied more heavily on external as 
opposed to internal adjustment mechanisms.23 But the pattern is similar and its 
markets are among the most open. Judith Goldstein shows that "[a]s tariffs de­
creased and imports increased their market share in the 1960s and 1970s, 
American producers did react by petitioning the bureaucracy for protec­
tion."24 Nevertheless, the government's response did not simply mirror the in­
creased petition activity. "When confronted by a choice between giving aid or 
not, the executive gave no aid. When protectionism was mandated by the bu­
reaucracy, the president often chose to give a transfer payment, to give less 
than recommended or, in the case of countervailing duties, to sanction a tariff 
waiver. In dumping findings, legislation leaves no recourse but to assess a 
duty. However, every effort was made to convince the exporter to halt the 
practice."25 Voluntary export restraints (VERs), negotiated directly with the 
exporting country, became the instrument of choice for the executive branch 
to avoid mandated actions. But while the U.S. government thereby may have 
provided adversely affected domestic industries with many things, Goldstein 
concludes, "effective protection" was not one of them.
In the 1970s, Congress twice changed the rules to make it easier for import- 
affected industries to obtain trade relief: in 1974, as part of legislation autho­
rizing U.S. participation in the GATT's Tokyo Round, and in 1979, in legisla­
tion approving the liberalizing results of that Round. Many more petitions 
were filed thereafter. "But in terms of actual relief granted, industry petition­
ers were again to be disappointed."26 So the rough balance continued to hold.
23 The impact of size on state structure and corresponding policy tools vis-à-vis the 
international economy are spelled out by Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Small European 
States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in 
John Gerard Ruggie, ed., The Antinomies o f Interdependence (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). For a comparative study of die correlates of nontariff barriers 
which reaches similar conclusions using 1980s data, see Edward D. Mansfield and Marc 
L. Busch, "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers” (forthcoming).
24 Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection," American 
Political Science Review, 80 (March 1986), p. 169. This is a comprehensive analysis of 
all statutory restraints imposed by the United States since the 1950s. Also see Goldstein, 
"Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," in G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake 
and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). p. 169.
25 Goldstein, "Political Economy of Trade,” p. 180.
26 See Destler, American Trade Politics, chap. 6, for a discussion of these changes; the 




























































































The instrumentalities of relief, however, shifted. The use of the most difficult- 
to-prove, injury under the escape clause provision, began a steady decline in 
the late 1970s, the government in many instances moving directly to negotiate 
VERs with the exporting country. In contrast, antidumping and countervailing 
duty cases, in which the criteria are vague, more arbitrary, and thus easier to 
meet, began a steady climb. Trade adjustment assistance to labor was also en­
hanced in the 1970s. But the United States -  as a liberal welfare state, in Mary 
Ruggie's terminology27 -  lacked a sufficiently active labor market policy to 
make that provision succeed. It was significantly reduced by the Reagan ad­
ministration.
The stagflation of the Carter years put great pressure on the trade relief 
system in the United States. But during the early Reagan years, the proverbial 
"all hell broke loose." William Niskanen, a member of the Reagan Council of 
Economic Advisers and a strong defender of the administration's overall eco­
nomic program, summarizes the episode in these terms:
Trade policy in the Reagan administration is best described as a strategic re­
treat. The consistent goal of the president was free trade, both in the United 
States and abroad. In response to domestic political pressure, however, the 
administration imposed more new restraints on trade than any administration 
since Hoover.28
The domestic political pressure, in turn, had two main sources. The first 
was the consequences of the administration's own macroeconomic policies. 
The value of the U.S. dollar appreciated by nearly 60 percent in real terms 
from 1981 to 1985. Not surprisingly, imports surged during the same period, 
from 18.9 percent to 25.8 percent of total U.S. goods production, and exports 
plummeted by "a drop nearly as great as that precipitated fifty years earlier by 
the Great Depression and the Smoot-Hawley Act."29 The resulting trade deficit 
dwarfed all previous peaks. "Not only was this imbalance unprecedented for 
modem America; it was the worst imbalance experienced by any advanced in­
dustrial nation since the 1940s."30 It is virtually axiomatic that trade relief 
measures should have exploded to equally unprecedented levels. For a brief 
time new trade impediments actually may have out-weighed market opening 
trends.
27 On the differences between liberal, social democratic, and neo-corporatist forms of 
welfare states, see Mary Ruggie: The State and Working Women (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); "The Paradox of Liberal Intervention," American Journal of 
Sociology, 97 (January 1992); and Realignments in the Welfare State (forthcoming).
28 William A. Niskanen, Reaganomics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 
137.
29 Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 201.




























































































The second source was more directly electoral in nature. The Reagan imbal­
ances created vast opportunities for entrepreneurial politicians of both parties 
to build electoral support on platforms of "fair trade rules" and "level playing 
fields" to protect American industries and jobs from "unfair" foreign competi­
tion. When the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986, this general 
political mode took on a distinct partisan tint as well. A president from the 
other party who seemed invincible in so many other respects was exceedingly 
vulnerable on the trade issue. The trade bills that emerged in the House and 
Senate "threatened the most substantial reversal of U.S. trade law since the 
United States took the lead in rebuilding the world trading system in 1934."31 
And yet, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 that was finally 
passed into law veered off that course -  perhaps aided by Wall Street's "Black 
Monday," when the Dow Jones Industrial Average went into a 500 point free- 
fall. The Act "did not impose statutory protectionism, and it did not impose 
direct congressional control over trade."32
Indeed, a reversal had already begun to set in, first in monetary policy, then 
in the trade imbalance and corresponding requests for relief. Former 
International Trade Commission (ITC) chair Paula Stern describes the situa­
tion by the late 1980s:
less than 1 percent of total U.S. imports were actually challenged as unfair 
under U.S. trade laws. The volume of U.S. imports affected by antidumping 
and countervailing duty investigations as a percentage of total imports 
amounted to only 0.2 percent in 1987, 0.4 percent in 1988, and 0.2 percent 
during the first half of 1989. Even in the cases where the [ITC] and 
Department of Commerce (DOC) made affirmative determinations, the aver­
age dumping duty applied in 1987 on dumped or subsidized goods was 1.2 
percent. In 1988, the average was 3.7 percent; in the first half of 1989, the 
figure was 1.4 percent31 23
Destler draws up a similarly judicious assessment for the decade as a whole: 
"the most reasonable conclusion is that American trade protection increased 
sharply in the early 1980s but receded somewhat thereafter. The net increase 
over the decade was less than one might have expected given the pressures at
31 Niskanen, Reaganomics, p. 150. Among them was the infamous "Gephardt amendment” 
introduced by the Democratic Representative from Missouri, whose presidential bid 
featured neoprotectionism. If adopted, the amendement would have imposed import 
quotas on countries running large bilateral surpluses with the United States. It was 
eventually replaced by the Super 301 provision (see below).
32 Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 95.





























































































play."34 Congress also approved the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1993; the Uruguay Round accord awaits Congressional action.
In short, the evolution of U.S.'s "new protectionism" has not undermined 
continued liberalization; on the whole, the two have proceeded in parallel. One 
major exception was a byproduct of the unusual conjunction of economic 
forces and policies during the early Reagan years. Another, less striking ex­
ception is the tendency by the U.S. to adopt external adjustment mechanisms 
because of its unwillingness or inability to institute certain domestic mecha­
nisms. The reduction of trade adjustment assistance to labor is a case in point; 
it has made organized labor in the United States an implacable foe of liberal­
ization and a ready ally in coalition politics for trade protection -  with poten­
tially high costs, as revealed in the NAFTA debate when labor joined forces 
with major environmental groups to oppose the treaty. Similarly -  and with 
greater justification -  the U.S. opposes "industrial targeting," and "industrial 
policy" more generally. The U.S. political system cannot agree to institute 
such practices, variants of which are widely pursued abroad, but nor can it 
simply afford to ignore the combined forces for emulation (sought by labor, 
for example) and retaliation (sought by import-sensitive industries). The ten­
sion was resolved in the 1988 trade legislation by declaring the practice "un­
reasonable" and subject to retaliatory action.35
Even apart from these anomalies, the longer-term vulnerability of the sys­
tem has also become apparent, underscoring the need for more robust multi­
lateral rules to govern nontariff barriers.36 The Uruguay Round accord con­
tains new provisions regulating countervailing duties, antidumping, and the in­
vocation of safeguards, as well as new dispute settlement procedures.37 Of 
course, it remains to be seen how effective these will be in practice.
Managed Trade
The embedded liberalism baseline permits us to differentiate between such 
instruments as VERs, antidumping and countervailing duty actions, on the one
34 Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 207.
35 As Destler points out (pp. 161-165), the latter provision was actually a victory for 
restraint because it began as a bill to legislate protection.
36 One perverse feature of the current system is the vast legal and lobbying services industry 
it has generated; legal fees for the steel sector alone in 1992 were predicted to exceed 
$100 million. See Keith Bradsher, "Trade Gap Too High? Export a Few Lawyers," New 
York Times, July 2, 1992, p. Dl. The deterrent effects -  or anticipated rewards -  of 
these legal and lobbying activities themselves skew the incentives of producers, which 
economists are beginning to model. See Michael P. Leidy, "Trade Policy and Indirect 
Rent Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work," Economics & Politics, 6 (July 1994).




























































































hand, and more pernicious forms of "managed trade," on the other. Two dif­
ferences stand out. First, most instruments of the co-called new protectionism 
do not seek to fix bilateral or overall market shares, but to slow down or limit 
the rate of increase in imports in the attempt to give domestic industry time to 
adjust to new competitive environments. Under "managed trade,” however, 
governments go well beyond cushioning the burden of adjustment. They 
negotiate or otherwise set market shares. The controversial side-letter to the 
1986 semiconductor agreement between the United States and Japan, which 
seemed to promise U.S. exporters a 20 percent share of Japan's domestic mar­
ket within a five-year period, is a case in point. Another is the Multifibre 
Arrangement -  a vast web of bilateral quotas indicating who can sell how 
much of which textiles and apparel to whom -  though at U.S. initiative, gov­
ernments in the Uruguay Round agreed to phase it out. The proposed U.S.- 
Japan autoparts deal that gave President Bush such grief on his 1992 Tokyo 
visit would have been another instance, as would the numerical targets for 
market opening the Clinton administration initially sought from Japan, which 
were later watered down to seeking "objective criteria" for measuring 
progress toward that end.
Second, in most instances the instruments of the "new protectionism" are not 
permanent features of the trading landscape. As Aggarwal and his colleagues 
demonstrate, different arrangements exhibit different temporal patterns re­
flecting, among other factors, industry structure.38 The authors suggest that 
temporary restraints are characteristic of small industries with low barriers to 
entry and exit. In the face of foreign competition, domestic firms use the ad­
justment period afforded by the restraints to take their money and run. 
Restraints on color television and footwear imports into the U.S. provide ex­
amples. Longer-term institutionalized barriers are found, they suggest, in la­
bor-intensive industries with low barriers to entry but high barriers to exit. 
Here firms are politically important and stuck. The Multifibre Arrangement, a 
prime instance of managed trade, illustrates this pattern. Finally, sporadic re­
straints tend to occur in industries characterized by large firms, high entry 
barriers but also high adjustment or exist costs. In the cases of steel and auto­
mobiles, for example, firms should have used the opportunity afforded by re­
straints to adjust earlier, but for a variety of reasons they did not, obtaining 
renewed protection instead. Adjustment finally did come about and the re­
straints were removed. Managed trade arrangements, in contrast, are more 
likely to remain in place for a longer duration. This is so because they tend to 
freeze in market shares, increase cartelization, and lower long-term competi­
tiveness. Moreover, they are far more susceptible than the "new protection­
ism" to the broad and complex array of political pork-barreling and bureau­
38 Vinod K. Aggarwal, Robert O. Keohane, and David B. Yoffie, "The Dynamics of 




























































































cratic inanities -  such as the U.S. insisting, purely as a byproduct of internal 
negotiating tradeoffs, on limiting the import of cotton diapers under the 
Multifibre Arrangement even though the entire U.S. industry at the time con­
sisted of one plant with 60 employees.39
Once these differences are spelled out, it becomes clear that managed trade 
remains, by many orders of magnitude, the exception to the rule.
Coercive Discrimination
Let us turn next to the allegedly coercive and discriminatory treatment that 
VERs in particular are said to impose. Exporters typically act under the threat 
of worse to come if they fail to reach agreement with the importing country. 
U.S. trade negotiators, for example, have frequently threatened to turn 
Congress loose on Japanese exports -  hence the accusation that this practice 
constitutes coercion if not outright relapse to the rules of the jungle. Two 
counterarguments come to mind.
First, because VERs limit the volume of an import its value often rises.40 
Thus, the scarcity rents produced by government intervention in the importing 
country is transferred to the exporter -  and is paid by consumers in the im­
porting countries. Paying off exporters at the expense of one's own consumers 
is an odd form of international coercion -  indeed, so odd that Japanese auto­
mobile manufacturers decided unilaterally to impose such an arrangement on 
themselves as they shifted their efforts in the U.S. market from selling 
medium-priced models to capturing the luxury market from European ex­
porters. In other cases, a secondary market in quotas has actually emerged, 
complete with quota brokers; the markets for textile quotas in Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Taiwan are cases in point. The current costs of these prac­
tices to U.S. consumers per job saved are so high that rationalization in some 
form is inevitable.41 By means of information exchange and systematic trade 
policy reviews, the "trade policy review mechanism" adopted during the 
Uruguay Round should make these costs far more transparent.
Second, those who charge coercion typically ignore the fact that not only the 
threatened unilateral but even the existing multilateral alternative to VERs
39 Lindley H. Clark, Jr., "How 'Managed Trade' Would Really Work,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 9, 1989.
40 This feature of VERs was pointed out long ago by David Yoffie, Power and 
Protectionism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
41 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Measuring the Costs o f Protection 
in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994). 
The estimate for 1990 alone was $70 billion; in 21 sectors studied, estimates of the per- 




























































































would leave the exporter worse off than VERs do. As Brian Hindley has 
pointed out, "for most countries confronted with a request for a VER, the al­
ternative, should they refuse, is not unrestricted trade but an Article XIX 
emergency action [under the GATT], In that event, the exporting country will 
find itself faced with a tariff on its exports or by formal quota restrictions on 
them with the quota rights going to importers... rather than to exporters. In 
either case, the profits of the exporting industry will be reduced... "42 What is 
more, unlike the case of VERs, there is no effective time limit on how long 
Article XIX safeguards may remain in force; as noted above, VERs generally 
do have such a limit at the end of which they either expire or must be renego­
tiated. Finally, no country claiming injury under Article XIX has ever had its 
claim challenged. In any practical as opposed to purely rhetorical sense, there­
fore, the charge of coercion is specious: the exporting industry typically gets a 
better deal under VERs than it would under the legally prescribed, multilateral 
alternative.
The charge of discrimination is somewhat more complex. That these prac­
tices are discriminatory cannot be questioned; it is the very reason they are in­
voked. The real issue, however, is whether VERs or the legally permissible 
alternative, again an escape clause action under Article XIX, do more collat­
eral damage to the trade regime. And it is not obvious that Article XIX should 
be preferred on those grounds, because in principle it should be applied in a 
nondiscriminatory manner, thereby adversely affecting innocent bystanders. 
The retort that escape clause action under Article XIX nevertheless should be 
preferred on principle, because VERs are not sanctioned by GATT and are, 
thus, technically illegal is a perfect example of what Aliber describes as "sac­
rificing the state to save the constitution." No rational government can be ex­
pected to follow the precept when well established acceptable alternatives are 
available. Besides, the term "illegal" itself is highly problematical in this con­
text. "A much better analogy is the out-of-court settlement of civil legal ac­
tions," Hindley suggests, "a procedure whose outcome is constrained by the 
law, but which both parties to the dispute expect will leave them better-off 
than undergoing the expenses of the full judicial process. No legal system will 
collapse as a result of such agreements (on the contrary, if there were no such 
agreements, collapse would be very much more likely)."43
42 Brian Hindley, "Voluntary Export Restraints and GATT's Main Escape Clause," The 
World Economy, 3 (November 1980), p. 321; for more recent econometric confirmation, 
see Yoshiyasu Ono, "Orderly Marketing Arrangement in the Context of the GATT 
Regime," Economics & Politics, 3 (July 1991).
43 Hindley, "Voluntary Export Restraints," pp. 331-332. Demonstrating how refined this 
system has become -  and underscoring the efficacy of Hindley's analogy -  several U.S. 
VERs on steel imports have included "short supply" provisions, whereby domestic 
consumers of steel could petition the Commerce Department for additional imports if they 




























































































Thus, in practical as opposed to rhetorical or legalistic terms, the charge 
that VERs are coercive is specious, while their discriminatory nature probably 
has helped preserve the broader trade regime rather than undermining it.
Aggressive Unilateralism
We come, finally, to a recent tendency in U.S. trade policy that critics have 
labeled "aggressive unilateralism."44 If interwar bilateralism was the evil that 
energized the creation of the postwar multilateral trade regime, then unilat­
eralism must be even more noxious, especially unilateralism of an aggressive 
kind. The chief culprit here is the amended Section 301 of U.S. trade legisla­
tion, especially the so-called Super 301. Whereas Regular 301 targets "unfair" 
trade practices, Super 301 lists target countries and mandates timely action by 
the executive branch. Under these provisions the U.S. assumes the right to act 
as accuser, judge, and jury in assessing which trading practices by others are 
unfair, and to impose punishment on those it finds guilty. The practice is 
clearly GATT-illegal, even under the creative criteria for "justified disobedi­
ence" that Hudec has devised.45
One of the justifications for Section 301 measures that even critics have 
trouble refuting is that GATT processes for dealing with "unfair" trade prac­
tices and restraints are exceedingly clumsy, slow, difficult to prove, and even 
harder to settle, while the prospects for reforming them in the absence of ex­
ternal pressure have seemed low. The U.S.'s trading partners, understandably, 
have never liked Section 301, even before the "Super" version was introduced. 
But the only comprehensive empirical study of its actual effects in fact shows 
that, not only has Section 301 been tolerated abroad, it has also had a net lib­
eralizing effect on world trade.46 In any event, WTO institutional reforms 
may alleviate some of the remaining problems.
complexity, at one point the Congressional Steel Caucus -  consisting of representatives 
from steel-producing states -  became concerned that Commerce was not acting in a 
sufficiently timely manner on such short supply petitions, and asked the General 
Accounting Office to investigate. By creating what amounted to a safeguards provision 
on a safeguards provision, the Caucus was eager to signal sensitivity to major domestic 
industries that use steel as an input, hoping to reduce their opposition to the VERs. 
United States General Accounting Office, "International Trade: Administration of Short 
Supply in Steel Import Restraint Agreements," Statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, 
GAO/T-NSIAD-89-35, May 23, 1989.
44 The term is due to Bhagwati and Patrick, Aggressive Unilateralism.
45 Hudec, "Thinking about the New Section 301," in ibid.
46 Thomas O. Bayard and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation: An Evaluation 
o f Aggressive Trade Policies (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 
1994). These unilateral means have produced multilateral outcomes in the past. The 
original Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 "encouraged the United States to make 




























































































The reason for Super 301 can be simply put: Japan. Even though the amend­
ment is expressed in universalistic language and three "unfair" traders were 
identified in its first year of operation, it would not have been adopted were it 
not for Japan.47 Specifically, the provision was animated by a growing consen­
sus in U.S. political circles that Japan's domestic structures, policies, and prac­
tices have kept Japan’s market relatively sheltered against foreign competition 
while boosting Japan's exports, thereby contributing to the high and seemingly 
permanent bilateral trade imbalance in favor of Japan.
U.S. debates of Japan's trade practices and industrial organization are often 
politically and even emotionally charged. On one side are alleged Japan-bash­
ers, on the other the so-called Chrysanthemum club. Periodic outbursts of 
racist commentary occur in both countries. When all else is stripped away, 
however, there is one dimension of Japan's trade flows that stands apart from 
the other major industrialized economies: its relatively low levels of intra-in­
dustry trade. Yet intra-industry trade has been a privileged area for trade lib­
eralization by the industrialized countries. Therefore, Japan's difference pro­
duces political friction, no matter what its causes may be.
A generation ago, neoclassical theory still viewed intra-industry trade as 
being socially less profitable than inter-industry trade, all other things being 
equal.48 But governments in successive GATT rounds have encouraged the 
liberalization precisely of intra-industry rather than inter-industry trade. As a 
result, specialization has been achieved not by countries abandoning entire in­
dustrial sectors, but "mainly by individual firms narrowing their product 
lines."49 There are, of course, straightforward economic reasons why intra­
industry trade among the major industrialized countries should have grown 
throughout the postwar era, having to do with similarities of production 
structures, the existence of scale economies, and satisfying consumers' prefer­
ences for variety. But there were also strong political reasons for governments 
in those countries to have encouraged such trade: the domestic social and polit­
ical adjustment costs of intra-industry trade are lower because whole segments
complaints filed by the United States between 1975 and 1985, eleven complaints arose 
out of section 301 investigations." Julia Christine Bliss, "GATT Dispute Settlement 
Reform in the Uruguay Round: Problems and Prospects," Stanford Journal o f 
International Law, 23 (No. 1, 1987), p. 45. The fear that Japan’s market opening in 
response to U.S. unilateral pressure may be limited largely to U.S. firms is expressed by 
an Australian academic, Aurelia George, "Japan's America Problem: The Japanese 
Response to U.S. Pressure," The Washington Quarterly, 14 (Summer 1991).
47 Brazil and India were also named in the initial U.S. review, largely for tactical reasons.
48 See Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (1968; New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 75-76.
49 Richard Blackhurst, Nicolas Marian, and Jan Tumlir, "Trade Liberalization, 





























































































of producers and the work force are not threatened by it, and yet it offers 
gains from trade. In a word, the liberalization of intra-industry trade is more 
compatible with the political economy of the embedded liberalism compro­
mise.
This puts the "Japan problem" in a somewhat clearer light. As Edward 
Lincoln documents, Japan tends to import least precisely in those areas in 
which it exports most, so that its level of intra-industry trade is at or near the 
bottom in virtually every industrial sector.50 Granted, Japan is resource-poor 
and needs, therefore, both to import raw materials and to export manufac­
tured products to pay for those imports. Even so, Japan has exhibited a much 
stronger preference than other resource-poor industrialized countries for en­
tirely unprocessed or the simplest refined forms of raw materials imports. 
And on the manufactured exports side, Japan exhibits a far greater level of ex­
port concentration in selected high value-added products than its competitors. 
Finally, while the lowering of formal trade barriers, according to both theory 
and the historical experiences of other industrialized countries, should have led 
to the erosion of this pattern, it has not.51
The "Japan problem," then, is not a matter of Japan cheating on the formal 
GATT rules. Japan's tariffs are low, its quotas are few, and its outright rule 
violations are less frequent than many other industrialized countries. The 
structure of Japan's trade is simply, but importantly, different from the estab­
lished behavioral norm around which the trade regime has come to revolve. It 
is this difference that has led even non-Japan-bashers to single out Japan's 
trading pattern as "adversarial."52
50 See Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1990). There is another side to this argument: see, for example, Gary R. 
Saxonhouse, "Comparative Advantage, Structural Adaptation, and Japanese 
Performance," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The Political Economy 
o f Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Gary R. Saxonhouse and 
Robert M. Stem, "An Analytical Survey of Formal and Informal Barriers to International 
Trade and Investment in the United States, Canada, and Japan," in Robert M. Stem, ed., 
Trade and Investment Relations Among the United States, Canada, and Japan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). Judicious assessments may be found in Paul 
Krugman, ed., Trade With Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991); and John Ravenhill, "The 'Japan Problem' in Pacific Trade," in 
Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill, eds. Pacific Economic Relations 
in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993).
5* Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade. Also see John Ravenhill, "The 'Japan Problem' in 
Pacific Trade.”
52 "In adversarial trade the seller's goods displace the goods produced by the manufacturers 
of the buying country without any compensating purchases from that country." Peter 
Drucker, "Japan and Adversarial Trade," Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1986. Paul 
Krugman, in an article explaining why Japan is not the major cause of America s 




























































































This issue is not without irony because in some sense Japan appears merely 
to be ”follow[ing] the principle of comparative advantage," as the Economist 
notes approvingly.53 Policymakers in its trading partners are less sanguine, 
however. Leave aside the thorny questions of why Japan exhibits the pattern of 
trade it does and how it is sustained. Whatever its causes, the result is that 
Japan poses serious political problems for other governments: "The fact that 
intra-industry trade has become a normative pattern of behavior for other 
countries means that Japan's failure to conform imposes adjustment costs on 
the industries of other countries that they do not expect to bear."54 It also im­
poses costs on governments as they struggle to deal with pressure from af­
fected domestic industries. In no sector is this challenge perceived to be of 
greater economic and political importance than in high-technology industries, 
the cutting edge of future economic performance.55
Returning to Super 301, then, this provision may be seen as an attempt by 
the United States to devise a tit-for-tat strategy vis-à-vis Japan intended to in­
duce Japan to change its trade pattern, premised on the assumption that Japan's 
domestic economic structure contributes to that pattern.56 In the event, Japan 
was not moved to retaliate against the United States when targeted by Super 
301, or even to bring action within GATT. Though Japan refused to negotiate 
formally under Super 301, it sought to defuse the issue by reaching several ac­
cords with the U.S. under the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 
-  one of the more successful in the long and continuing series of U.S.-Japan 
trade talks.57
play by the same rules as the other great economic powers." Krugman, "Japan is Not Our 
Nemesis," New Perspectives Quarterly, 7 (Summer 1990), p. 44.
53 "Japan's troublesome imports," The Economist, January 11, 1992, p. 61; and "Trade 
made the ship to go," in the same issue, pp. 11-12.
54 Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade, p. 60.
55 Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology 
Industries (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992), addresses 
the mix of trade and industrial policy issues posed by these industries. As chair of the 
Clinton administration's Council of Economic Advisors, she presumably also affords 
insight into current U.S. policy.
56 Such an approach was proposed by Stephen D. Krasner, Asymmetries in Japanese- 
American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity (Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, 1987). The seminal work on the tit-for-tat strategy as 
an inducement to cooperation is Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation (New 
York: Basic Books, 1984).
57 For a good survey of recent bilateral trade negotiations between the two countries, see 
Merit E. Janow, "Trading with an Ally: Progress and Discontent in U.S.-Japan Trade 
Relations," in Gerald C. Curtis, ed., The United States, Japan, and Asia (New York: 
Norton 1994). Super 301 expired in 1990, but President Clinton reactivated it by 
executive order in 1994 after ongoing talks with Japan broke off and prior to submitting 




























































































Hudec has made the provocative and potentially productive suggestion that 
America's trading partners should hold the U.S. accountable to its own new 
301 standards, in the attempt to increase the demand for collectively legiti­
mated "fair trade" mechanisms.58 Indeed, a 1992 report of an industry advi­
sory council to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
did accuse the U.S. of committing nine types of unfair trade practices. Being 
new at this game, the Japanese outdid even the U.S. Congress in hyperbole, ac­
cusing the U.S. of being "the most unfair" trading nation of them all. But the 
real intention, a MITI official quickly added, "is to use GATT more fre­
quently" in the hope of devising a workable definition of fairness.59 That in it­
self constituted a major concession by Japan, which had never before acknowl­
edged fairness to be an issue.
Conclusion
Let us step back now, and assess the overall configuration of the trade 
regime today. To begin with, despite proliferating instruments of the "new 
protectionism," the markets of the industrialized countries are more open than 
ever before. This anomaly has led the distinguished international economist, 
Jagdish Bhagwati, to puzzle why "the growth of protectionism appears signifi­
cant but its consequences do not."60 Within the embedded liberalism frame­
work, however, there is no anomaly to begin with: the bulk of the so-called 
new protectionism may be seen, instead, as a predictable institu-tional adapta­
tion to continued liberalization in very different international competitive en­
vironments than existed in the past.
At the same time, there can be little doubt that the formal instruments of the 
trade regime have become weaker over time. For example, in its entire history 
GATT has taken up just over 200 cases under the dispute settlement proce­
dures of Articles XXII and XXIII. That number that was matched by U.S. 
unilateral antidumping and countervailing duty cases in their peak year of 
1982.61 Because the executive branch typically used its discretionary authority 
to minimize giving protection, Congress gradually restricted, though it has 
never sought to eliminate, the range of discretion. Delicate maneuvering be-
Congressional action. Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton to Reinstate Power to Move Fast 
on Japan Sanctions,” New York Times, March 2, 1994, p. Al.
58 Hudec, "Thinking About the New Section 301."
59 James Stemgold, "Japan is Trying New Approach in Trade Battles," New York Times, 
June 8, 1992, p. Al.
60 Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), p. 56.
61 The GATT figure is taken from Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby, "GATT. Dispute 
Settlement and Cooperation," Economics & Politics, 4 (July 1992); the U.S. figures 




























































































tween the two branches of government turned into an avalanche of trade pro­
tection in the early to mid-Reagan years. But by the late 1980s, the situation 
had begun to turn back to a more stable equilibrium.
Moreover, the domestic political coalitions of U.S. trade policy are chang­
ing in subtle but significant ways, which promise to help contain future pro­
tectionism. The One Hundredth Congress (1987-88) voted on more trade legis­
lation than any other in the postwar era. A recent analysis of those votes re­
veals several instructive patterns.62 The effects of divided government 
(partisanship) were evident, a traditional protectionist coalition remained in­
fluential in the House, and conventional "free" trade retained little support be­
yond the Republican party. Substantial clusters of "fair" trade and "strategic" 
trade advocates had also emerged. However, they "are not simply protectio­
nisms] in disguise.”63 Indeed, they opposed protectionism, they were more 
likely to be liberals, and to received financial support from internationally- 
oriented business. If there was an overall winner, the study concludes, it was 
this new "fair" trade coalition.
In addition, the Uruguay Round provisions for nontariff barriers, once en­
acted, should also arrest some of the longer-term erosion in the rules of the 
game. Its provisions for agriculture and investment, though only a beginning 
in extending multilateral trade rules to these domains, also appear to reflect 
the familiar balancing of international and domestic objectives.64 *And the 
Uruguay Round accord is uniformly applicable to all parties -  even without 
the bond that bipolarity had provided the Western capitalist countries in the 
past. This differs significantly from the Tokyo Round, whose "minilateral" 
codes for nontariff barriers held only for countries that specifically agreed to 
sign them, thus producing a more fragmented trade regime -  a development 
realist political economists at the time attributed to declining American hege­
mony.63
62 Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and 
Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987-88," International Organization, 48 (Summer 
1994).
63 Ibid., p. 518.
64 This case is made by Robert Wolfe, "Opening Up the Green Box: Why Agriculture 
Dominated the Uruguay Round," paper prepared for presentation to the International 
Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March 1993; and by the same author, "Does 
Embedded Liberalism Endure? Some Evidence from the Uruguay Round Negotiations on 
Investment" (Kingston, Ontario: Center for International Relations, Queens University, 
n.d.).
63 See Stephen D. Krasner, "The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interest and Prospects for 





























































































Finally, changing industry preferences promise to reinforce equilibra-ting 
tendencies. All economies, including the American, have become more inter­
nationalized. Export-dependent industries and multinational firms more gen­
erally are less likely to demand protection even if they are under pressure 
from import competition in a specific sector. To the extent that they seek trade 
policy relief from their governments, it is more likely to be for securing ac­
cess to markets abroad. Some of the most advanced industrial sectors, includ­
ing semiconductors, commercial aircraft, and telecommunications, exhibit this 
pattern.66 The net effect of such pressure for what is sometimes called "volun­
tary import expansion" should be liberalizing. However, if it were to result in 
negotiated market shares, as in the U.S.-Japan semiconductor side-letter, then 
it would increase the incidence of managed trade, which violates both the spirit 
and letter of postwar norms.
In sum, the postwar trade regime was designed to achieve progressive lib­
eralization internationally, without, however, subordinating domestic stabi­
lization to external strictures; and to allow for and even facilitate governmen­
tal intervention in the domestic economy, without, however, triggering the 
mutually destructive consequences of the interwar period. This traditional 
stabilization problem has been managed, with exceptions noted above, about as 
well as can be expected in a world of sovereign states. Indeed, they do not de­
serve the disproportionate share of attention they continue to receive in aca­
demic and policy circles. Far more vexing problems have emerged in recent 
decades, which pose far more fundamental challenges to prevailing policy in­
strumentalities, institutional frameworks, and even to organizing concepts and 
theories than the practices of the new protectionism.
66 See Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics o f 
International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Helen V. Milner and 
David B. Yoffie, "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a 
Theory of Corporate Demands," International Organization, 41 (Spring 1989); and 
Stephen Engelberg, with Martin Tolchin, "Foreigners Find New Ally is U.S. Industry," 





























































































Due in part to the successes of the postwar trade and monetary regimes, 
point-of-entry barriers to international economic transactions have been vir­
tually eliminated, financial markets are globally integrated, and entire sectors 
of production have become thoroughly transnationalized. This transformation 
in the world economy has had significant positive welfare effects. But it is also 
severely straining the constitutive premises and institutional foundations of the 
postwar economic regimes, and of national economic policymaking as well. To 
try and squeeze these issues into the conceptual containers of liberalism vs. 
protectionism, however, as many observers are prone to do, misconstrues 
them seriously. In this section, we examine this transformation and the chal­
lenges it poses for the governance of international trade relations.
Contested Domestic Domains
It was no secret to economists in the 1930s that imperfect competition, and 
patterns of domestic industrial organization more generally, produced signifi­
cant effects on international trade.67 Articles 46-54 of the Charter of the 
International Trade Organization reflected these concerns, as they sought to 
curtail a variety of restrictive business practices that might shape trade flows. 
By virtue of Article 46, for instance, members of the ITO would have pledged 
"to prevent... business practices affecting international trade which restrain 
competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, when­
ever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or 
trade..."68. In the immediate postwar years, these concerns were removed 
from the international trade agenda by a two-step process. The first was the 
defeat of the ITO in the U.S. Senate, which left conventional point-of-entry 
barriers as the portfolio of the quickly-assembled GATT. Second, GATT then 
avoided the related conceptual problems posed by state-trading nations, such as 
the Soviet Union, by calling for state-trading enterprises in their external pur­
chases and sales simply to behave like private economic units: "solely in accor­
dance with commercial considerations”, in the words of Article XVII of the 
GATT, that is, in response to factors such as price, quality, transportation
67 Two works that come to mind readily are Edward Chamberlin, The Theory o f 
Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929), and 
Joan Robinson, The Economics o f Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan, 1931).
68 Articles 47 through 52, as well as Article 54, further defined the salient terms and 
specified the remedies available under the ITO. Article 53 made special provisions for 
handling restrictive practices in traded services. The full text is reprinted in Clair Wilcox, 




























































































costs and similar terms of purchase or sale.69 Thus, the external significance 
of divergent institutional features of domestic economies was assumed away. 
As noted above, the postwar economic regimes were assigned the tasks remov­
ing or lowering point-of-entry barriers such as quotas, tariffs, and currency 
exchange restrictions, as well as banishing deliberate acts of cheating such as 
export subsidies, dumping or currency manipulation.
Now that point-of-entry barriers have become progressively lowered or 
eliminated, the impact of domestic economic policies and institutional ar­
rangements on international economic transactions has soared in salience. Over 
a decade ago, Richard Blackhurst, a well-known GATT staff economist, al­
ready foresaw "the twilight of domestic economic policies."70 A shift was 
taking place, Blackhurst noted, in distinguishing between "international" and 
"domestic" economic policy: from a definition of international as border mea­
sures, to any policy, no matter what the instrument or where it was applied, 
which had an "important" impact on international transaction flows. 
Moreover, Blackhurst predicted,
barring either a major retreat into protectionism such as occurred in the 1930s 
or a massive reduction in the level of government intervention in the econ­
omy, the reclassification will continue into the foreseeable future, aiming to­
wards an end point where few economic policies of any consequence will be 
considered primarily domestic.71
This trend to some extent affects monetary relations as well as trade. But it 
is more advanced in trade, and also more intense because domestic trade relief 
measures make compensatory and retaliatory moves more readily accessible. 
That, in turn, poses serious problems for the conduct of trade policy. The 
GATT is designed, in the words of one legal scholar, "to maintain a balance of 
[external] concessions and obligations, not to restructure nations."72 Yet "re­
structuring nations" -  at least, aspects of nations -  is what trade disputes in­
creasingly have come to be about. Below, I describe briefly some of the sub­
jects at issue, and indicate the array of possible implications for the gover­
nance of international trade relations.
69 These words were taken almost verbatim from the ITO Charter, which the Soviets had a 
hand in drafting. See Jacob Viner, "Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter," 
Foreign Affairs, 25 (January 1947); and Herbert Feis, "The Conflict Over Trade 
Ideologies," Foreign Affairs, 25 (July 1947).
70 Richard Blackhurst, "The Twilight of Domestic Economic Policies," The World 
Economy, 4 (December 1981).
71 Ibid., p. 363.
72 Patricia Kalla, “The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where Do We Go 





























































































One of the subjects at issue is domestic economic structures -  defined 
broadly to include both government policies and policy networks, as well as 
patterns of private sector industrial organization. Sylvia Ostry, a former 
OECD official, differentiates three stylized forms among the leading capitalist 
countries: the pluralist market economy characteristic of the United States, the 
social market economy of Continental Europe, and Japan’s corporatist market 
economy.73 For the moment, Ostry would accept as "given" behavior, tastes, 
and institutions that have "cultural and historical roots," because the "appro­
priate domain of policy co-operation is government policy."74 To reconcile 
the most serious trade effects of economic policy differences among these 
three forms of market economies, Ostry suggests, requires convergence in the 
following areas: competition policy, including merger law; research and de­
velopment policies, especially subsidies; the asymmetry of access in the in­
vestment area, which largely targets Japan; and financial regulation as it af­
fects corporate governance, such as, for example, bank ownership of firms. 
Even if we accept Ostry's concession to culture and history, achieving policy 
convergence in the areas on her list remains a daunting task.
The deepest difference on each of these policy dimensions lies between 
Japan and the other two, and the largest and most intractable trade imbalance 
is between Japan and the United States. As the Japan debate makes clear, a nar­
row focus on specific policies alone, as Ostry recommends, is simply not 
practical. At issue in that debate are the organization of Japan's labor market, 
capital markets, as well as ownership, production, and distribution systems; the 
economic role of the state; and, indeed, even the nature of its electoral system. 
All of these factors have been adduced as affecting Japan's trade and invest­
ment posture -  and not simply by American "revisionists,"75 but also by 
Japanese analysts and relatively dispassionate U.S. observers.76 The experts
73 Sylvia Ostry, "Beyond the Border: The New International Policy Arena," in OECD, 
Strategic Industries in a Global Economy (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 1991), pp. 83-84.
74 Ibid., p. 84.
75 The exemplar of this school is Chalmers Johnson. Almost any work of his is relevant to 
this discussion, but see in particular "The Japanese Political Economy: A Crisis in 
Theory," Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 2 (1988).
76 See, for instance, Shigeto Tsuru, Japan's Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a brief summary of 
various arguments about Japan's economic structure as it relates to international trade, see 
Daniel I. Okimoto, "Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade," in Inoguchi 
and Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan. On industrial policy, see Daniel I. 
Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); on investment policy, Dennis J. 




























































































disagree on whether these differences in economic structures are declining, as 
liberal economists tend to believe, or are more enduring features of Japanese 
society.77 Alas, policy-makers elsewhere lack the luxury of waiting to find out 
who is right.
As difficult as it is, ultimately the highly charged case of Japan masks a 
more generic problem that would be with us in any event. Now that border 
barriers have been reduced to insignificant levels, domestic economic struc­
tures ipso facto are taking center stage in international trade disputes. If they 
diverge systematically and have "important" effects on international transac­
tion flows, then an international political problem potentially exists.
The domestic economic structures of one's trading partners now enter the 
international trade policy agenda via "unfairness" claims. The potentially 
deleterious consequences are four-fold. First, what constitutes fairness in this 
regard tends to be determined unilaterally by the aggrieved party. As Hudec 
points out, "there are relatively few international agreements regulating the 
substance of such claims, and there is no recognized tribunal to adjudicate 
them in common law fashion."78 GATT has nothing to say on the subject, and 
progress within the WTO is likely to remain modest, focused largely on such 
"traditional" issues as antidumping and countervailing duties.
Second, by their nature fairness claims call for unilateral concessions on the 
part of the accused party: "To say that certain conduct is unfair is to say that 
the guilty party must correct it for that reason alone."79 Or, as Komiya and 
Itoh characterize U.S. demands regarding Japan's trade practices that it deems 
unfair: "Usually trade negotiations between two countries take the form of 
give-and-take, but in these negotiations, which have been going on almost con­
tinuously since 1976, the subject matter has been simply how much and how 
soon Japan would make concessions, with the United States offering little if
Cornell University Press, 1992); and on the nature of the electoral system as it affects 
multilateral commitments, see Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally -  Order Globally: 
Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., 
Multilateralism Matters (New York; Columbia University Press, 1993).
77 The two positions are illustrated, respectively, by Bhagwati, The World Trading System 
at Risk, pp. 24-44; and Kozo Yamamura, "Will Japan's Economic Structure Change? 
Confessions of a Former Optimist,” in Yamamura, ed., Japan's Economic Structure 
(Seattle: Society for Japanese Studies, University of Washington, 1990).
78 Robert E. Hudec, "'Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall': The Concept of Fairness in United 
States Trade Policy," paper presented at the "Roundtable on Fair Trade, Harmonization, 
Level Playing Fields and the World Trading System: Economic, Political and 






























































































anything in exchange."80 In contrast, GATT processes, and presumably any 
future corresponding processes in the WTO, rest on mutual concessions as the 
basis for agreement unless specific legal obligations can be shown to have been 
violated. When it comes to fairness claims, therefore, the GATT and WTO are 
in the impossible position of having to cope with structural asymmetries by 
means of symmetrical accommodation.
Third, if policy harmonization were to become the preferred vehicle for 
dealing with the international effects of domestic policies and arrange-ments, 
questions such as these would arise immediately: harmonization to whose stan­
dard? Who decides whose standard will become the norm? And how? In addi­
tion, the slippery-slope of policy harmonization is steep: as indicated by the 
240 items raised by the United States in the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments 
Initiative talks, their potential scope is virtually without limit.
Fourth and finally, to the extent that unilateral measures become the instru­
ment of choice to achieve, for instance, market access abroad -  as it often has 
been for the United States in relation to Japan -  when they are generalized 
across multiple issues and numerous countries the likelihood of retaliation and 
cycles of escalation can only grow.
In short, the premise that differences in domestic economic structures could 
be ignored in organizing the international trade regime no longer holds. 
Intrinsically, the issue has little to do with protectionism, though of course it is 
susceptible to capture by protectionist forces. It has everything to do with the 
growing irrelevance of the traditional distinction between "internal" and "ex­
ternal" policy domains -  or with the contestation of where, precisely, the one 
ends and the other begins.
There are no obvious or simple solutions to the policy problems posed by 
this transformation. Blackhurst recommends that governments adopt new 
multilateral rules to defend themselves from pressures originating at home no 
less than abroad:
[G]eneral international rules are at least as useful in protecting a government 
from domestic interest groups as they are in protecting it from abuses by 
other governments. It is no paradox that the observance of general rules in­
creases a government's freedom and ability to pursue genuine national inter­
ests.81
80 Ryutaro Komiya and Motoshige Itoh, "Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 
1955-1984,” in Inoguchi and Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan, p. 203.




























































































But the process will be more difficult than Blackhurst supposes. As Cowhey 
and Aronson have suggested, it will require a subtle but significant shift in the 
focus of commercial policy, away from trade per se toward the formal and in­
formal conditions governing market access.82 Moreover, because non-border 
policies are in the hands of a variety of domestic agencies other than trade 
ministries, the collective policy process must include international agencies in 
addition to GATTAVTO.
For new multilateral rules to become feasible, however, it is first necessary 
to enhance the collective transparency of domestic economic structures and 
practices, devise commonly accepted definitions, collect comparable statistics, 
and conduct policy studies whose rigor and objectivity enjoy broad legitimacy 
among domestic economic policy officials in the major nations involved, and 
which would serve as the basis for systematic joint policy reviews. The rela­
tionship between competition policy, investment policy, and trade seem the 
most plausible initial candidates for such a regimen, though success cannot be 
taken for granted.83 The OECD, with an expanded membership and mandate, 
is better equipped than any other international organization to undertake these 
complex and delicate tasks.84
Greening Trade
With trade ministers and other high-level officials from 109 countries as­
sembled to sign GATT's Uruguay Round accord in Marrakech, Morocco, in 
April 1994, U.S. Vice President A1 Gore announced that Washington would 
seek to address the relationship between trade and the environment in future 
WTO negotiations -  it had not gone far in the Round itself.85 The Vice 
President is a committed and accomplished environmentalist in his own right. 
One suspects, however, that the close Congressional vote on NAFTA's ratifi­
82 Peter F. Cowhey and Jonathan D. Aronson, Managing the World Economy: The 
Consequences o f Corporate Alliances (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 
chap. 8.
83 For a pessimistic scenario, based largely on institutional differences between Japan and 
the rest, see Karel van Wolferen, "Will The New World Trade Organization Work? No 
Chance -  East and West Trade Won't Meet,” Washington Post, June 26, 1994, p. C3.
84 The Clinton administration made such a proposal in the spring of 1994. See Alan Riding, 
"O.E.C.D. Being Pressed to Change Its Mission,” New York Times, June 5, 1994, p. 
D2. The OECD's predecessor, the OEEC, was established to monitor the implementation 
of the Marshall Plan. Whereas the Soviet Union rejected participation in the program for 
itself and its satellites, Russia has now signed an association agreement with the OECD, 
and Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are "partners in transition." 
Mexico has become the first developing country to join.
85 Alan Riding, "Gore Insists Environment is a Trade Issue," New York Times, April 15, 
1994, p. D l; William Drozdiak, "Historic Trade Pact Signed, But Global Tensions 




























































































cation also influenced the administration's position. Several major environ­
mental organizations, notably the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, caught 
politicians by surprise when, together with organized labor, they orchestrated 
an effective campaign against the treaty, forcing the administration to negoti­
ate a supplemental environmental accord.86 (The same was true of labor stan­
dards, discussed below, the other future trade issue flagged by Gore at 
Marrakech.) Efforts to "green" trade had begun in earnest.87
Gore's environment proposal received support from representatives of 
other industrialized countries, but developing countries were uniformly nega­
tive. The Indian Commerce Minister spoke for many: "We see no merit what­
soever in the attempt to force linkages where they do not exist."88 Private 
commentators were less polite, accusing the industrialized world of practicing 
"ecoimperialism" in the name of spaceship earth while ignoring what Indira 
Gandhi as far back as the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, 
held in Stockholm, had called "the pollution of poverty."89 Along the way
86 The ecology groups charged that NAFTA would not only export pollution to Mexico but 
also worsen transborder environmental problems along the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico 
frontier. See Tim Golden, "A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds Over Trade 
Accord," New York Times, August 13, 1993, p. Al.
87 The event which fully mobilized the environmental movement against the trade regime 
was not pollution in Mexico but a 1991 GATT ruling against the United States having to 
do with the Mexican tuna-dolphin issue. A law suit brought by the Earth Island Institute, 
a California environmental group, forced a reluctant U.S. administration to impose a ban 
on the import of Mexican tuna caught using purse seine nets because that process also 
killed dolphins in excess of limits set by the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
Mexico took the case to the GATT, which decided against the U.S. The ruling was so 
ultra-orthodox in its construction of the relevant GATT articles, however, that it lent itself 
to the interpretation that trade dominates the environment on principled grounds within 
GATT, and that unprotected common property resources have no standing in GATT trade 
law. Mexico became so concerned about the adverse impact of the ruling on prospects for 
NAFTA that it never sought to have it officially adopted by GATT. The case -  and its 
significance for environmental politics -  is discussed by Daniel C. Esty, Greening the 
GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), pp. 29-33, and throughout.
88 Cited in Riding, "Gore Insists," p. D2.
89 Indeed, observers with longish historical memories recognized the inversion that 
Marrakech represented in the positions the industrialized "north" and developing "south" 
had held at Stockholm. There, developing countries sought in vain to introduce trade 
dimensions of environmental degradation to their advantage, but those efforts at "linkage 
politics," as it was termed, were abruptly rebuffed by the industrialized north, led by the 
United States. Developing countries asked, for example, that GATT and UNCTAD study 
the extent to which global pollution might be ameliorated by substituting natural products 
for synthetics; the U.S. opposed the proposal. Brazil argued that one reason for soil 
degradation and tropical deforestation in developing countries was the overutilization of 
marginal agricultural lands, due to low and unstable export prices -  Brazilian coffee was 
cited as a case in point. Brazil proposed remedial action on prices and price stability for 




























































































from Stockholm to Marrakech, the earlier affinity between environment and 
development groups has frayed, with major northern environmental organiza­
tions now forming alliances of convenience with, and providing new targets of 
opportunity to, the most protectionist segments of their domestic societies.
The trade-environment nexus is conceptually ill-defined, substantively 
highly complex and prone to perverse feedback effects, as well as exceedingly 
subjective.90 Moreover, it pushes external transgression of the domestic policy 
domain well beyond the issue of economic structures and practices that may or 
may not affect trade, to include what economists like to call "tastes," or eco­
nomically and culturally conditioned preferences and values -  which environ­
mentalists, in contrast, view as overriding concerns of universal validity. For 
present purposes, it is useful to distinguish three classes of cases.
The first concerns the trade effects of asymmetrical environmental stan­
dards. This has generated by far the most heat in policy circles. U.S. House of 
Representatives Majority Leader Richard Gephardt has promised to push for a 
"Green 301" provision, permitting the imposition of "ecoduties" on imports 
produced under conditions that are inferior to U.S. environmental standards; 
the Commission of the European Union has indicated that for the EU the issue 
of ecodumping is not negotiable; trade economists and GATT officials predict 
that the already fragile trade regime could unravel altogether under the strains 
of what might be called eco-countervailing wars; and policymakers in develop­
ing countries fear that staggering additional costs will further impede their de­
velopment prospects.91
Among the major OECD countries, this issue can, and no doubt will, cause 
turmoil for some time to come. In the long run, however, there are reasons to 
believe that it should be largely self-correcting. For one, systematic differ­
ences in environmental standards among the leading trading nations are declin­
ing, and so too, therefore, are across-the-board (dis)advantages they may 
cause. This sets up a strategic situation in which "green retaliation" becomes 
more feasible than in the past, possibly serving as a deterrent and a stimulant 
to further policy convergence. Stronger efforts to implement the polluter-pays
forest depletion and soil erosion. The U.S. considered this a trade, not an environment, 
issue. And so it went. (Based on participant observation by the author, representing a 
nongovernmental organization.)
90 Esty's book. Greening the GATT, is an admirable and environmentally-sensitive effort to 
establish some degree of conceptual order and policy priorities among the many and 
diverse issues involved. From a trade-dominant perspective, see "Don't green GATT," 
The Economist, December 26, 1992-January 8, 1993; and "The greening of 
protectionism," The Economist, February 27, 1993.




























































































principle would help this process along.92 In addition, because environmental 
abatement expenditures tend to account for a relatively small share of the total 
cost of most final products, if countervailing ecoduties were to be imposed 
they would be relatively modest -  and politicians might become persuaded that 
they are not worth the pains. Finally, if U.S. ecoduty unilateralism were to be­
come a truly serious threat, it would be surprising if its major trading partners 
sooner or later did not challenge the substantial subsidy (or environmental 
cost) provided (imposed) by the very low U.S. energy prices relative to 
Europe and Japan.93 Eco-countervailing those would overwhelm the value of 
any ecoduties the U.S. might levy in the first place. Accordingly, the most se­
riously affected targets of measures aimed at offsetting divergent environment 
standards are likely to be newly industrializing and developing countries. Not 
only are differences in their environmental conditions more pronounced, as is 
to be expected, but these countries typically lack the means to retaliate and de­
ter.
A second class of cases concerns, not the environmental context within 
which goods are produced, but goods' environmental content. That content, in 
turn, can be defined as a product standard or a process standard. Product stan­
dards are hardly new, and exploiting their environmental variants for com­
petitive advantage, while troublesome, poses no fundamental conceptual chal­
lenge for the trade regime.94 What is new and difficult to accommodate is the 
notion that goods must be produced in accord with certain processes that are 
deemed environmentally sound. At the very core of nondiscrimination in in­
ternational trade is the most-favored-nation norm, requiring that like imports 
be treated alike, as well as national treatment, requiring the no-less-favorable 
treatment of imports than of like domestic goods. "A car, for GATT, is a car. 
No, say the greens, it is also an assembly of metals and chemicals produced in 
certain ways"95 -  and they would treat cars and other imports differentially 
depending on certain environmental features of their production.
Among the OECD countries, the basic strategic situation that we described 
above for the issue of context standards may also, after much toing-and-fro-
92 Candice Stevens, "The Greening of Trade," OECD Observer, 187 (April/May 1994).
93 Under the tightened subsidy rules devised in the Uruguay Round, the grounds 
presumably would be government revenues (energy taxes) foregone for the sake of 
achieving competitive advantage.
94 U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) mileage standards for cars are 
illustrative. Though technically nondiscriminatory, in practice they discriminate against 
European upscale imports -  in addition to excluding light trucks, which would lower 
U.S. fleet averages. A model-by-model tax would be truly nondiscriminatory. The case 
remains under review by a GATT panel. A brief description may be found in Esty, 
Greening the GATT, Appendix C.




























































































ing, come to shape content standards. If not harmonization, then movement 
toward mutual recognition of standards may result where economic ties are 
particularly close.96 Once again, therefore, newly industrializing and develop­
ing countries are likely to be most seriously affected. The Mexican tuna-dol­
phin case illustrates the problem. The trade-off was this: an economically ef­
ficient means of generating protein and export earnings on Mexico's side vs. 
the psychological spillover effects in the United States of knowing that a much­
loved but non-endangered mammal was being excessively harmed in the pro­
cess of tuna fishing on the high seas. Wanting NAFTA, Mexico lived with the 
U.S. ban even though GATT ruled it illegal.
Yet a third class of cases involves the use of trade restrictions against coun­
tries to achieve environmental objectives. Here too there are several variants. 
The least problematical is the situation in which an environmental treaty is in 
force which contains such sanctions as part of its implementation mechanisms. 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, for in­
stance, bans trade in controlled substances even with nonparties.97 A somewhat 
softer case is domestic legislation imposing trade sanctions on violators of an 
international environmental accord which does not itself, however, contain any 
such provision. U.S. trade restrictions on Norway for flouting the interna­
tional whaling moratorium exemplify this variant. Both types of measures are 
generally viewed to make positive contributions at acceptable costs. Punitive 
trade measures in the pursuit of environmental goals become more problemat­
ical, however, when both the ends and means are unilaterally determined, and 
when they seek to impose the domestic preferences of one country on others. 
It may be true, as Jessica Mathews has argued in this regard, that "unilateral 
action... also goes by the name of leadership."98 But that does not elevate ev­
ery instance of unilateralism to an expression of leadership. Typically, the 
criteria for confirming leadership require, at minimum, acquiescence by oth­
ers based on the perceived plausible legitimacy of an act, not on power asym­
metries alone.
In coping with environmental cases of contested domestic domains -  as well 
as protection of the global commons, a much larger subject than can be ad­
dressed here -  the WTO will have to become environmentally more literate
96 The European Union is a case in point. In NAFTA's environmental accord, Mexico 
undertook to strengthen enforcement of environmental laws already on the books, backed 
by a commission with the power to impose fines and trade sanctions. See Golden, "A 
History of Pollution.”
97 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1991). The protocol also includes the commitment to consider, within five years, 
extending trade restrictions to products made with controlled substances.





























































































and better staffed than the GATT has been. Here too it will require assistance 
from the OECD, which has been active at the intersection of environment, 
competition, and trade policies for many years. Beyond that, successful efforts 
to strengthen international environmental agreements should reduce the heavy 
burden the trade regime now bears -  though, as Esty acknowledges, some en­
vironmentalists oppose trade because they regard it intrinsically inimical to 
environmental quality."
Developing countries, as we have seen, are likely to remain more vulnera­
ble. The reaction of their representatives to Vice President Gore's speech at 
Marrakech, therefore, is not surprising. Developing countries resist paying for 
global environmental degradation that was produced by the north at the same 
time as the north insists that the south neither magnify the problem nor negate 
efforts to arrest it, now that the north has begun to change its ways. Resolving 
this distributive dilemma would be exceedingly difficult under the best of cir­
cumstances. It is one thing to proclaim that environment and development need 
not stand in contradiction, and that, indeed, they converge in the concept of 
"sustainable development."100 It is another to make it so. For example, there 
may be no single policy measure that would more greatly enhance the 
prospects for sustainable development in the north and south alike than lifting 
northern agricultural subsidies: they are hugely expensive, create environmen­
tal harm, and deprive developing countries of export markets where they have 
a clear comparative advantage, while forcing them into environmentally-de­
grading marginal production in the attempt to keep up commodity export 
earnings.101 Much the same is true of barriers imposed on some of their man­
ufactured exports. As the Economist puts it: "Allow poor countries to sell 
shirts and shoes, and they are less likely to sell leather and logs."102
In addition, punitive approaches to developing country environmen-tal 
policies exact a high price: "Force the poor to apply first-world standards, and 
they will have less for health care and education."103 Positive approaches on 
the part of the north include a greater commitment to technology transfer and 
additional financing of incremental environmental costs; and on the part of the 
south, moving toward incentive-based environmental strategies at home, and
"  Esty, Greening the GATT, chap. 2.
100 This concept was first officially advanced by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (the "Brundtland Commission," named after its chair, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, the Prime Minister of Norway), in Our Common Future (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987).
101 The United States and many other countries favored fairly rapid movement in this 
direction in the Uruguay Round, but ultimately had to compromise in the face of French 
opposition.





























































































the adoption of so-called joint implementation mechanisms for international 
environmental accords, such as the global climate change convention.104 
Adding to the political weakness of the developing countries in the 
trade/environment area is the fact that they lack an OECD equivalent to help 
articulate and safeguard their collective interests, concerns, and policy options; 
neither UNCTAD nor the UN Sustainable Development Commission, estab­
lished by the 1992 Rio Earth Summit,105 is presently equipped to play that 
role.
Labor Standards
The other new trade-related issue that Vice President Gore sought at 
Marrakech to place on the WTO's future agenda was labor standards. In doing 
so, the Washington Post editorialized, "the Clinton administration is blowing a 
kiss to unions that are still sore about the free trade agreement with 
Mexico"106 -  a gesture undoubtedly also aimed at the broader electoral base of 
Ross Perot, still agitated by the predicted "giant sucking sound" of jobs mov­
ing south. The U.S. position was strongly backed by France. The developing 
countries finally acceded to having labor standards discussed, but not before 
accusing the north of generating "a new brand of protectionism," and warning 
against "the use of trade to bring external pressure for change in countries’ 
domestic political or social structures."107
In some respects, then, the issue of labor standards looks much like the issue 
of trade and environment. The major difference is that it will become almost 
entirely a north-south affair. The U.S. is unlikely to demand policy conver­
gence with the European economies: work place conditions do not diverge 
significantly; and in a comparison with seven European nations, amenities fa­
vor European workers, U.S. manufacturing wages are lower than in all but
104 By and large, developing countries have been extremely distrustful of incentive-based ap­
proaches for being too market-oriented. In the case of the climate change convention, 
developing countries have resisted, for the same reason, innovative proposals by some of 
the industrialized countries for abatement credits the industrialized countries would earn 
by reducing the often far worse pollution in third world countries. See Daniel Bodansky, 
"The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary,” Yale 
Journal o f International Law, 18 (Summer 1993). This developing country attitude may 
change now that their overall economic policy posture is changing.
105 See Earth Summit: Agenda 21 ["The final text of agreements negotiated by Governments 
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 3-14 
June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil"] (New York: United Nations, 1992).
106 "Exporting Labor Standards," Washington Post, April 10, 1994, p. C6.
107 The first comment came from Pakistan's Commerce minister, the second from 
Singapore's trade minister. See Riding, "Gore Insists," p. D2. See also Peter Behr, 





























































































Britain and France, while U.S. unions are the weakest.108 Indeed, the contrast 
between the two policy arenas can be drawn more starkly. In the case of the 
environment, the United States seeks to project preferences abroad that reflect 
a strong domestic policy base; in the area of labor standards, the U.S. is as 
much pushed abroad by weakness in its domestic policy base that it has been 
unwilling or unable to fix. Pressure for protectionism from U.S. labor groups 
in the guise of the best interests of developing-country workers would be far 
less intense if this domestic weakness were dealt with more effectively. As a 
U.S. policy on labor standards and trade begins to emerge, therefore, one 
hopes that it will not neglect the domestic side.
It is well beyond the scope of the present study to suggest what a U.S. do­
mestic labor market policy should look like.109 But we can describe briefly 
what is lacking now, as it affects trade policy. U.S. trade adjustment assistance 
for labor was sharply reduced during the Reagan administration. But even be­
fore, the policy had done less and less to encourage "adjustment" — in the form 
of retraining workers displaced by imports for employment in more competi­
tive industries, for example. In the end, it did little more than extend the du­
ration of unemployment benefits.110 Indeed, the United States has done a poor 
job compared to its major OECD trading partners in devising an active labor 
market policy; it ranks last among them in government expenditures for that 
purpose -  save for Japan which, with lifetime employ-ment, has required no 
such policy.111 Moreover, health care benefits for workers are more precari­
ous and less portable in the U.S., while pension benefits are less secure. 
Outside the military, vocational training programs in the U.S. are fragmented, 
episodic and more often than not of low quality.112 And long-term unem­
ployment has remained high even when overall unemployment has declined. 
Perhaps the best that can be said for this policy posture is that the U.S. has the 
most flexible labor market of any OECD economy, which may be a desirable 
attribute in many respects. At the same time, however, future U.S. competi­
108 William Drozdiak, "New Global Markets Mean Grim Trade-Offs," Washington Post, 
August 8, 1994, pp. A l, A12.
109 An interesting set of proposals may be found in the most recent book by the current U.S. 
Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st 
Century Capitalism (New York: Knopf, 1991).
110 See Destler, American Trade Politics, pp. 152-153. The Clinton administration has 
proposed eliminating them altogether, and using the savings for more productive 
retraining efforts. See Frank Swoboda, "Reich Targets Several Job Programs," 
Washington Post, January 28, 1994, pp. Al, A10.
111 For a comprehensive survey of policies, see Thomas Janoski, The Political Economy of 
Unemployment: Active Labor Market Policy in West Germany and The United States 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).
112 For example, Germany, with less than one-third the U.S. population, has nearly six 
times the number of industrial apprenticeships. "Training up America," The Economist, 




























































































tiveness "is being threatened by a dearth of skilled workers"113 -  and its trade 
policy by displaced skilled and unskilled workers who are the instrument of 
"flexibility" in the face of increased liberalization and lower-cost foreign 
competition.
When the U.S. policy focus shifts abroad to address labor rights and condi­
tions in developing countries, advocates and policymakers alike appear to find 
it hard to resist the interstate commerce analogy. Accordingly, we can expect 
to be reminded frequently of Franklin Roosevelt's message to Congress in 
1937 on the Fair Labor Standards Act: "Goods produced under conditions 
which do not meet a rudimentary standard of decency should be regarded as 
contraband and ought not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate 
commerce."114 But before this sentiment becomes U.S. trade policy scripture 
it will need to be tempered by the recognition that the United States could af­
ford a substantially higher "standard of decency" in 1937 than prevailed at the 
time, and that a federal government existed which could legislate, enforce and, 
if necessary, help finance the cost of improvements.
Indeed, an appropriate international policy model on which to build already 
exists. Under the Generalized System of Preferences Act (GSP), developing 
countries are granted duty-free access to the U.S. market for many products, 
conditioned on their meeting five labor standards: freedom to associate, and to 
bargain collectively; the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, as well as 
child labor; and a process for establishing a minimum wage, taking into ac­
count each nation's level of economic development.115 The GSP now includes 
phase-out and graduation provisions that would need to be reexamined, be­
cause they diminish the preferences granted to some of the newly industrializ­
ing countries whose labor standards are likely to be most at issue. In addition, 
the GSP forum for addressing possible violations would need to become a 
broader dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, the entire system would have 
to be brought under the WTO.
The ultimate sanction under the GSP scheme is denial of duty-free access to 
U.S. markets. The use of negative trade sanctions, which U.S. Labor Secretary 
Reich -  no doubt for domestic consumption -  has put high on what he calls 
"the menu" of possible actions, should be reserved as a last resort, and they 
should be deployed only for very specific and systematic violations of basic
113 Ibid.
114 Cited in Terry Collingsworth, J. William Goold, and Pharis J. Harvey, "Time for a 
Global New Deal," Foreign Affairs, 73 (January/February 1994), p. 10.




























































































rights, not for the global version of "great society" programs that Reich would 
have them seek to achieve.116
What conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the growing inter­
mingling of domestic and international economic policy domains? To begin 
with, it is important to remind ourselves that the postwar trade regime was 
designed to balance external obligations and concessions among nations, not to 
restructure their domestic economies. Indeed, the trade regime was premised 
on and promised a substantial degree of domestic policy autonomy as long as 
certain rules concerning external consequences were observed. With the vir­
tual elimination of border barriers, however, restructuring aspects of domestic 
economies is what international trade policy increasingly has come to be about. 
For the major industrialized economies this process is occurring more indi­
rectly in the monetary realm, working largely through constraints imposed by 
financial markets on domestic policy options, and only secondarily by means 
of policy coordination.117
The locus of multilateral economic policymaking is slowly changing as a re­
sult. At the "international" level it is moving away from single institu-tional 
focal points with exclusive sectoral responsibility, toward constantly shifting 
policy networks simultaneously involving several agencies and forums, each 
covering several areas of policy. In addition, multinational lobbying at the 
"domestic" level is becoming an increasingly important element in collective 
policymaking, with Washington serving as a central and highly accessible de­
cisionmaking node in these policy networks, and Brussels, of course, playing 
an analogous role in the European Union. Beyond that, governments are em­
ploying unilateral, bilateral, as well as plurilateral strategies, including re­
gionalism, in the attempt to fill in policy voids.
What remains far from clear, however, is the substantive principles on 
which future multilateral policy frameworks may come to be based. The
11(1 Robert B. Reich, "Escape From the Global Sweatshop," Washington Post, May 22, 
1994, pp. C l, C4. Reich's article gave every appearance of being a policy trial balloon, 
and it used as its rhetorical foil a "leader" (editorial) in The Economist, categorically 
rejecting trade sanctions as a means to enhance labor standards in developing countries. 
See "Free trade or foul?" The Economist, April 9, 1994. As it often does. The Economist 
got the final word: "More than any other sort of economic policy, trade policy is prone to 
capture by narrow interests. The pressure to protect producers from foreign competition 
is intense and relentless. A new set of excuses for protectionism against imports from the 
third world (under Mr Reich's criteria, the list, written out in full, would be the most 
contentious and extensive ever devised) is certain to mean higher trade barriers and less 
trade, not just for the worst offenders on labour standards, but for others too." The 
Economist, "Economic Focus," June 4, 1994, p. 70.
117 For the developing countries, the international monetary regime has been much more 




























































































problem is particularly pronounced between, using Ostry’s terms, the U.S. 
"pluralist" and European "social market" economies, on the one hand, and 
Japan's "corporatist" form, on the other. The road to reconciling the external 
divergencies of these domestic economic forms will continue to be bumpy be­
cause visibility is poor, the available maps inadequate, and the metrics of mea­
suring distance or proximity only marginally better than guesswork.
Globalization
Much has been written about globalization and nearly as much has been dis­
missed as "globaloney.” Milton Friedman, as is his want, has put the negative 
case most categorically: "The world is less internationalized in any immediate, 
relevant, pertinent sense today than it was in 1913 or in 1929."118 Friedman 
contends that the divergence between the price of the same good in different 
countries that became distinctly pronounced after the Great Depression has 
remained in place despite steadily decreasing transportation costs, thus 
"demonstrating vividly how powerful and effective government intervention 
has been in rendering the law of one price far less applicable after 1931 than it 
was before."119
Friedman's observation that the world economy is far from being a single 
economy governed by the law of one price, such as the U.S. economy started 
to become toward the end of the last century, is largely correct -  but also ir­
relevant to the point at issue. Globalization today is assuming various microe­
conomic forms of increasingly extensive, diverse, and integrated institutional 
webs forged within markets and among firms across the globe. Illustrating the 
poverty of conventional concepts, this phenomenon typically is described as 
“off-shore” markets and "off-shore" production, as if they existed in some 
ethereal space waiting to be reconceived by the economic equivalent of rela­
tivity theory.
118 Milton Friedman, "Internationalization of the U.S. Economy,” Fraser Forum, February 
1989, p. 10.
119 Ibid. In a controversial paper published a quarter century ago, Waltz advanced a similar 
argument, using as his measures of internationalization (1) the size of the external sector 
of the major economic powers relative to their domestic economies, and (2) the degree of 
intersectoral specialization in their trade. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National 
Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed.. The International Corporation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970). With intrasectoral trade flows dominating among 
the major economies, the second part of Waltz's definition is a truism. The first is less the 
case today than it was in 1970, but more importantly it is also less relevant, for reasons 




























































































Most international economists have devoted little attention to these organiza­
tional forms because institutional economics is not much in vogue among 
them. The conventional notions of international politics do not go far to de­
scribe or explain them either, whether the liberal proclivity to discover that 
sovereignty is everywhere at bay or the realist security blanket under which 
nothing ever fundamentally changes. Little can be established conclusively 
about this transformation yet because no official definitions exist of the rele­
vant categories of analysis and so no uniform data are collected. The simplest 
of typologies will help us grasp intuitively the issues at stake, however. They 
derive from the work of the otherwise unlikely pairing of business school 
economists and their economist counterparts on the left, together with organi­
zational political scientists and sociologists. The first is the distinction between 
markets, hierarchies, and networks.!20 The second is the distinction between 
goods and services. A stylized discussion of these forms and their policy im­
plications follows.
Markets
One of the core premises of the postwar economic regimes was that interna­
tional economic transactions are conducted at arms-length between distinct and 
disjoint national economies. Several private-sector institutional transforma­
tions have called this premise into question, as also the policy measures based 
on it. The first concerns the mediating mechanism of the market itself.
International markets not only have expanded steadily, they have also ac­
quired historically unprecedented forms. The most significant institutional 
changes exhibited by international financial markets are their growth, diversi­
fication, and integration across national economies -  beyond even the wildest 
expectations of policymakers when they first decided to unleash them. Once an 
adjunct of trade, financial transactions now tower over annual trade flows by a 
ratio of at least 50:1. In addition to old-fashioned investment capital, there are 
international markets in currencies and equities, as well as derivatives of all of 
these, including options, futures, swaps and other means of hedging. Although 120
120 The standard conceptual works are Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New 
York: Free Press, 1975), and Walter W. Powell, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: 
Network Forms of Organization," Research in Organization Behavior, Vol 12 
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1990). For a suggestive application of these concepts to the 
evolution of international corporate strategies and structures, see Stephen J. Kobrin, 
"Beyond Geography: Inter-Firm Networks and the Structural Integration of the Global 
Economy," (Philadelphia: William H. Wurster Center for International Management 




























































































they are physically separated, these markets are global in that they "function as 
if they were all in the same place"121 -  in real time and around the clock.
This evolution -  perhaps revolution is the more appropriate term -  has se­
rious consequences for economic policymaking. Virtually by definition, previ­
ously assumed cause-effect relations and trade-offs, between exchange rates 
and trade balances, say, or between interest rates and exchange rates, are 
bound to be confounded by the complexities of this new financial world. 
Cooper summarizes the general point thusly: "When markets evolve to the 
point of becoming international in scope the effectiveness of traditional in­
struments of economic policy is often greatly reduced or even nullified."122 *
The international markets for goods and services, similarly, have expanded 
and diversified. But their most significant institutional change is the fact that 
they have become overshadowed altogether by new organiza-tional forms 
which internalize both production and exchange within global corporate 
structures. We briefly describe two characteristic forms and their implications 
for policy.
Hierarchies
The rate of increase in international production -  that is, production by 
multinational enterprises outside their home countries -  began to exceed the 
rate of increase in world trade by the 1960s. Sometime in the 1980s, the actual 
volume of international production began to exceed trade flows. Today, the 
worldwide sales of multinational firms, at $5.5 trillion, is only slightly less 
than the entire U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). U.S.-based multinationals 
play a major role in international production; their revenues from 
manufacturing abroad are now twice their export earnings. 123
Accordingly, a recent U.S. Department of Commerce study sought to mea­
sure how different the U.S. position in world markets would look if the stan­
dard balance-of-trade measure were combined with the net effects of sales by 
U.S.-owned companies abroad and of foreign-owned companies in the United
121 John M. Stopford and Susan Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World 
Market Shares (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 40.
122 Richard N. Cooper, Economic Policy in an Interdependent World (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1986), p. 96. A senior executive of Gillette, a major multinational consumer 
products firm, gives concrete expression to this generalization: "In the long run... 
currency fluctuations, up and down, don't mean a whit in the decision where to 
manufacture." Cited in Louis Uchitelle, "U.S. Corporations Expanding Abroad at a 
Quicker Pace," New York Times, July 25, 1994, p. D2.





























































































States. It found that on this more inclusive indicator of global sales and pur­
chases of goods and services the U.S. consistently has been earning a surplus, 
rising from $8 billion in 1981 to $24 billion in 1991, even as its trade deficit 
deteriorated during the same period from $16 billion to $28 billion.I24 
Nevertheless, the conduct of U.S. trade policy and the invocation of trade re­
lief measures continue to be driven by trade imbalances, which every year re­
flect less well the actual U.S. position in world markets. (The new measure 
would not significantly alter the U.S.-Japan imbalance, however, because of 
asymmetries in investment access to the U.S. and Japan, together with the 
more pronounced tendency by Japanese multinationals to import from home- 
country suppliers rather than purchasing locally. I25)
Thus, the fact that U.S. firms now produce more abroad than they export is 
in itself important. But an even more profound institutional shift follows from 
it: the dominant mode of organizing goods production and exchange in the 
world economy increasingly is "through administrative hierarchies rather than 
external markets."124 *26
The process began simply enough. For a variety of reasons, firms set up 
subsidiaries abroad to service local markets. Over the course of thirty years or 
so, the process became transformed into "the global factory."127 Led initially 
by the automobile and consumer electronics industries, components produc­
tion, sourcing, assembly, and marketing by multinationals spread across an ar­
ray of countries, exploiting the shifting advantages of different locales. Today, 
this pattern includes even the most advanced technological sectors. "The popu­
lar IBM PS2 Model 30-286 contains: a microprocessor from Malaysia; oscilla­
tors from either France or Singapore; disk controller logic array, diskette 
controller, ROM and videos graphics from Japan; VLSI circuits and video 
digital-to-analog converter from Korea -  and it's all put together in 
Florida."128
124 J. Steven Landefeld, Obie G. Whichard, and Jeffrey H. Lowe, "Alternative Frameworks
for U.S. International Transactions,” Survey o f Current Business, December 1993.
126 It is, of course, the case that some substantial -  though contested -  share of this 
imbalance is due to U.S. domestic macroeconomic imbalances. Encamation, in Rivals 
Beyond Trade, stresses the impact of investment asymmetries as well as differential 
patterns of sourcing and intrafirm trade flows. Also see Mordechai E. Kreinin, "How 
Closed is Japan's Market?" The World Economy, 11 (December 1988); and United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), World Investment Report, 
1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment (New York: United Nations, 1991).
126 Stephen J. Kobrin, "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Global Integration," 
Strategic Management Journal, 12 (Summer 1991), p. 20.
127 Joseph Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm, The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in 
International Trade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985).
128 Walter B. Wriston, "Bashing Japan With Flawed Figures," Washington Post, August 4, 




























































































As a result of this transformation, the template -  the mental picture of the 
economic world -  on the basis of which postwar economic policymaking and 
the international economic regimes were conceived has been rendered obso­
lete. In that picture, production was national, and countries were linked into an 
international division of labor by arms-length trade, portfolio investment, and 
direct investment in raw materials sectors or to secure local market access. 
Today, in significant measure the international division of labor is becoming 
internalized at the level of firms. Integrated administrative structures that span 
the globe increasingly manage the design, production, and exchange of parts, 
components, and finished products; the allocation of strategic resources, in­
cluding funds and skills; and the synoptic plans that rationalize these processes, 
including their location, for success in a competitive environment that is itself 
increasingly global. In short, for virtually every major industry, manufactures 
or services, the primary mode for the international organization of economic 
transactions has shifted away from reliance on international markets to include 
global administrative hierarchies.129 Thus, even as borders have become ev­
erywhere more open, in this specifically institutional sense global production 
and exchange may be said to have become more "closed." And even though 
states are actively involved in bargaining with individual firms about condi­
tions of access, for example, nowhere is economic policymaking remotely 
equipped to deal with the systemic policy consequences of this shift.130
For example, one consequence is the growth of intrafirm trade -  trade 
among subsidiaries or otherwise related parties. As of now, few official and 
uniform intrafirm trade statistics are collected. Episodic studies show that it is 
growing at a rate considerably more rapid than conventional trade. And they 
indicate that it is far less sensitive than conventional trade to such policy in­
struments as exchange rates.131 Other policy-related concerns that have been
7, which include case studies of automobiles, semiconductors, and telecommunications 
services.
129 Kobrin's papers have been particularly helpful to me in conceptualizing this 
transformation; see "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Global Integration,” 
and "Beyond Geography.” For a critical account of its consequences, in the industrialized 
countries as well as the third world, see Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global 
Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1994).
130 See David M. Gordon, "The Global Economy; New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" 
New Left Review, 168 (March/April 1988), who also adds a useful corrective by 
pointing out that "global" refers to the span of firms not to the universal spread of capital, 
which limits itself to "a few carefully chosen locations" (p. 57).
131 See Jane Sneddon Little, “Intra-Firm Trade; An Update,” New England Economic 
Review (May/June 1987); Mark Cassons, Multinationals and World Trade (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1986); and the earlier but still useful study by Gerald C. Helleiner, Intra- 




























































































raised about it include transfer pricing for the objectives of cross-subsidization 
and minimizing tax obligations.
Furthermore, this institutional transformation on occasion has begun to turn 
the conduct of U.S. trade policy into an almost metaphysical exercise -  
poignantly captured by Robert Reich's question: Who is US?132 For example, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) found itself confronted not 
long ago with antidumping charges brought by a Japanese firm producing 
typewriters in the U.S. against an American firm importing typewriters into 
the U.S. from off-shore facilities in Singapore and Indonesia.133 The confu­
sion is not limited to trade policy. During the Bush administration, the 
Pentagon became concerned about the fact that large and long procurement 
runs were unlikely to persist widely in the future and sustain the U.S. defense- 
industrial base. Among other options, the Pentagon considered a "reconstitu­
tion" model. However, it proved extraordinarily difficult to decide whether to 
define the entity that should be available for reconstitution by nationality of 
ownership, production locales, contributions to the economy, or citizenship of 
researchers -  the divergence between these indicators of national identity be­
ing so pronounced -  or to determine whether such units, however defined, 
would be available for "reconstitution" when needed.134 The growing ten­
dency by U.S. firms to internationalize research and development in costly 
high technology sectors has raised related concerns.135
Finally, this institutional transformation challenges what was perhaps the 
central relationship in the entire postwar American political economy. As 
Cowhey and Aronson depict its model of industrial organization, the federal 
government assumed that its primary role was to manage levels of consumer 
spending, provide R&D funding, and otherwise help socialize the costs of 
technological innovation via military procurement and civilian science pro­
132 Reich, The Work o f Nations, chap. 25.
133 The case involved Brothers Industries Ltd., a Japanese concern assembling typewriters in 
Bartlett, Tennessee, and Smith Corona, a U.S. concern doing the same off-shore. 
Adding another element of complexity. Smith Corona is owned 48 percent by Hanson 
P.L.C., a British group. See Robert B. Reich, "Dumpsters,” The New Republic, 10 
June 1991, p. 9; and David E. Sanger, "A Twist in Fair Trade Case: Japanese Charge a 
U.S. Rival," New York Times, August 12, 1991, p. Dl. Sanger's story also points out 
that Chrysler almost inadvertently filed an ITC claim against itself when it charged 
Japanese firms with dumping minivans in the U.S. market -  one of the vehicles covered 
by the definition was made for Chrysler by Mitsubishi. The Brothers request 
subsequently was denied, the ITC concluding that the firm was not enough of a domestic 
producer to claim injury.
134 Based on personal interviews.
135 Andrew Pollack, "Technology Without Borders Raises Big Questions for U.S.," New 




























































































grams. The major U.S. companies would take it from there. *36 Today, not 
only is it getting harder to determine whether something is an American prod­
uct any longer, as Reich observes, but more importantly whether the legal 
designation, "an American corporation," describes the same economic entity, 
with the same consequences for domestic employment and economic growth, 
that it did in the 1950s and 1960s.'37 The NAFTA debate about how many 
U.S. jobs would be lost or gained made it clear how little is known about the 
links between transnationalized production and trade policy, on the one hand, 
and domestic employment and economic growth, on the other. But it also 
demonstrated that previous premises about the nature of economic entities and 
relationships no longer fully capture essential features of the U.S. political 
economy.
This form of, in essence, denationalization may be welcomed by trade theo­
rists and academic specialists in trade law, on the belief that it will enhance 
global economic efficiency and welfare while decreasing government inter­
vention and thereby reduce trade disputes. But it may have just the opposite ef­
fect. If governments find that their array of policy tools, including the rela­
tively benign option of the "new protectionism," no longer suffice to achieve 
their objectives, there is no telling what measures they might turn to in exas­
peration. The appropriate posture of "cosmopolitan" policy analysts, there­
fore, is not to applaud the failure of "parochial" governments, but to help 
them devise new means to do their jobs.
Networks
Even as analysts and policymakers are still trying to assimilate the conse­
quences of globally integrated structures of production and exchange, the cor­
porate world has already pushed ahead with the next generation of institutional 
innovations. Generically, these have been described as network forms of or­
ganization; in large-scale, high-technology sectors they are more commonly 
known as "strategic alliances."13*
Networks... are especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose
value is not easily measured. Such qualitative matters as know-how, techno-
!36 Cowhey and Aronson, Managing the World Economy, pp. 16-17.
!37 Reich points out that of the $20,000 an American consumer paid in 1991 for a Pontiac Le 
Mans, about $6,000 went to South Korea for parts and operations, $3,500 to Japan, 
$1,500 to Germany, and an additional $1,400 to various suppliers of products and 
services in these and other countries; less than $8,000 of the total paid for goods and 
services that were produced in the United States. The Work o f Nations, p. 113.
13* See Powell, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy,” and Kobrin, "Beyond Geography." The 
most extensive discussion to date of the policy implications of strategic alliances is 




























































































logical capability, a particular approach or style of production, a spirit of in­
novation or experimentation, or a philosophy of zero defects are very hard to 
place a price tag on. They are not easily traded in markets nor communicated 
through a corporate hierarchy.139
In addition, the sheer size of investments and magnitudes of risks in many 
rapidly changing areas of high technology increasingly are beyond the capacity 
of even the largest firms, driving them to establish alliances.140
Paraphrasing Powell's typology, networks are a collaborative form of or­
ganization, based on complementary strengths, characterized by relational 
modes of interaction, exhibiting interdependent preferences, stressing mutual 
benefits, and bonded by reputational considerations. The field of strategic al­
liances is dominated by technology-intensive industries, such as semi-conduc­
tors, telecommunications, commercial aircraft, and automobiles. The major 
home bases of firms entering into alliances are the U.S., European Union 
(especially Germany), Japan, and Korea. Finally, Powell suggests that, as the 
globally integrated firm is discovering strategic alliances at the high end of 
R&D and in some instances production, it is also rediscovering the market at 
the low end of standardized components.141
Numerous questions attend the future of strategic alliances, especially how 
viable and permanent a form they really are. As the Economist warns: 
"Managing such vaguely defined relationships is difficult enough at the best of 
times; distance, language and culture bring added complications. Add to this 
the fact that many networks are in the business of closing plants and refashion­
ing markets, and you have a recipe for trouble."142 But if networks were to 
become a central and permanent feature of international economic organiza­
tion, then the focus of collective economic policy-making inevitably would 
have to shift toward some type of global industrial policy. At minimum, this 
would entail negotiating market access, as Cowhey and Aronson suggest. But 
negotiating market shares might not be far behind.143
Intangibles
The distinction between goods and services is the one final conceptual clari­
fication we shall introduce to elucidate the institutional transformation of the
139 Powell, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy," p. 304.
140 Kobrin, "Beyond Geography," stresses this particular causal factor.
141 Powell, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy."
142 "The discreet charm of the multicultural multinational," p. 58; see also "Does it matter 
where you are?” The Economist, July 30, 1994.




























































































world economy in recent decades. Services used to be the "invisibles" ap­
pendage to merchandise trade: shipping, insurance and the like, as well as 
tourism. Today the list is longer, the magnitude much higher, and services are 
said to be "traded" in their own right In addition to the old items, the list now 
includes information services, various financial, professional and business-re­
lated services, construction, cultural services, and many more. Their volume 
has reached somewhere between one fifth and one quarter of total world trade, 
though because of definitional and statistical anomalies the balance of world 
services imports and exports routinely is off by $100 billion or so per annum 
-  and that still understates hard-to-measure services that are embodied in 
traded products, such as design, engineering, or data processing. The expan­
sion of traded services is accounted for, in the first instance, by transnational- 
ized goods production, but also by technological developments, especially the 
informatics revolution, and domestic deregulation, particularly of capital mar­
kets and telecommunications.
The institutional challenge posed by traded services is not quantitative, how­
ever, but qualitative. The GATT was designed for merchandise trade: ball­
bearings and bananas cross frontiers, passing through customs houses on the 
way. Invisibles were left uncovered by GATT. Indeed, according to an etymo­
logical survey by Drake and Nicolaidis, services had not been regarded as be­
ing "traded" before 1972, when they were first so construed in an OECD ex­
perts' report: "the group took a huge leap by suggesting tentatively that the 
transactions in services could be considered trade, that the principles and 
norms for trade in goods might apply, and that the challenge in the emerging 
transition was to avoid "protectionism"."144 As the world's largest producer 
and "exporter" of services, the United States quickly embraced these notions. 
The U.S. pushed for GATT rules to govern traded services as early as the 
Tokyo Round of the 1970s, but with little success. The U.S. also had great 
difficulty getting services onto the agenda of the Uruguay Round, and when it 
did succeed the victory initially appeared largely symbolic.145 But in the end 
the Round did produce a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
144 William J. Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: 
"Trade in Services" and the Uruguay Round," International Organization, 46 (Winter 
1992), p. 45.
145 For a brief summary, see "Nothing to lose but its chains: A Survey of World Trade," The 
Economist, September 22, 1990. The United States was rebuffed at a 1982 GATT 
ministerial meeting, even by its OECD partners, in attempting to have the GATT 
secretariat merely catalogue impediments to international service transactions. The best it 
could do was to obtain approval for the idea that interested countries could conduct their 
own national studies of services and report back to GATT. At a 1984 meeting of GATT 
contracting parties the United States sought to have a GATT working party on services 
established. By then the U.S. was supported by most OECD countries but opposition 
from developing countries was adamant; they were led by India and Brazil (which 




























































































The GATS essentially consists of a set of general principles, a number of 
special conditions or exceptions, and initial liberalization commit-ments.146 
Traded services generally are to be governed by the classical GATT principles 
of nondiscrimination and transparency of domestic rules and regulations, but 
countries have the right to exclude specific services from the principles of na­
tional treatment and the right of market access. Safeguards provisions are in­
cluded and mechanisms for dispute settlement provided for. In short, trade in 
services will be brought under the GATT/WTO umbrella with an ultimate bal­
ance of obligations between domestic and international objectives which is 
more qualified than for merchandise trade, and also more individualized.
It is important to realize, however, that the GATS only marks the conclu­
sion of one chapter in a continuing story of very difficult economic diplo­
macy. It brings within the conventional trade framework that portion of 
traded services which countries are willing to fit into it. A number of highly 
contentious issues remain beyond the reach of this framework. Intrinsically, 
that fact has little to do with what one normally regards as trade barriers or 
protectionism, but stems largely from the unique attributes of services that dif­
ferentiate them from goods.
First, because the concept of services has no well-established place in eco­
nomic theory, its definition tends to be ad hoc and arbitrary: intangible activi­
ties not included in agriculture, mining and manufacturing.!47 Attempts to 
define services more theoretically have focused on their being non-storable, 
therefore requiring simultaneity in provision and use. But this insight has gen­
erated endless lists that can be endlessly argued about, rather than a finite and 
universally agreed set. With tongue only half in cheek, the Economist once
UNCTAD study which claimed that a services agreement would disadvantage the 
developing countries. (See UNCTAD, Services and the Development Process [Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1984], Among other things, the 
document denied the role of comparative advantage in services and stressed the salience 
of infant industry arguments.) In a compromise with developing countries, a more 
informal group was established. When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, most 
developing countries still opposed having services on the agenda, but by then the newly 
industrializing countries had become interested and thus a face-saving way to include 
services was found.
' 46 See Drake and Nikolaidis, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization;" and John M. Curtis 
and Robert Wolfe, "Nothing is Agreed until Everything is Agreed."
*47 Good discussions of the general conceptual issues attending the definition of services 
may be found in Jagdish Bhagwati, "Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations," The World Bank Economic Review, 1 (No. 4, 1987), and by the same 
author, "International Trade in Services and its Relevance for Economic Development," 
in Orio Giarini, ed., The Emerging Service Economy (London: Pergamon Press, 1987). 
On related problems in banking services, see "A Question of Definition: A Survey of 
International Banking," The Economist, April 7, 1990; and for informatics, "Netting the 




























































































proposed defining services as "Things which can be bought and sold but which 
you cannot drop on your foot."148 But in fact architectural plans, computer 
disks and magnetic tapes, not to mention Big Macs in Moscow or Budapest can 
be dropped on one’s foot. In short, unlike the case of merchandise trade, in 
traded services the very definition of the phenomenon remains subject to 
strategic behavior by governments -  the major cleavage being between capital 
and technology intensive services provided by the industrialized countries, and 
the labor intensive services of developing countries. There is no reason to ex­
pect that contested definitions will disappear because a GATS has been 
reached.
Second, governments typically regulate domestic service industries more 
rigorously than other economic activities. Entry into many services, such as 
medicine, law, or accounting is strictly licensed; governments often still re­
serve the right to approve utilities prices, which in many places still include 
transportation and telecommunications; financial institutions, such as banks, in­
surance firms, and securities traders are subject to prudential supervision; and 
in many countries the state still owns outright certain service industries. Most 
of these regulatory objectives and instruments were not designed with trade in 
mind. The principles of nondiscrimination, transparency, and national treat­
ment where it applies should moderate somewhat the impact of differences in 
national regulatory environments, but they will not eliminate the problem.
Furthermore, despite what Drake and Nicolaidis characterize as the "revo­
lution in social ontology" that reconceived services, the fact remains that rela­
tively few services are "traded" in any recognizable sense of the term. In mer­
chandise trade, the factors of production and the consumers stand still while 
the finished product moves. In traded services, the factors of production do 
the moving while the product is fixed in location. Thus, trade in services 
amounts to provider-mobility across borders. No economic theory justifies, 
however, why provider mobility should encompass U.S. banks and insurance 
firms offering financial services in Seoul, for example, but not South Korean 
construction workers providing their services in Seattle -  an issue that exer­
cised developing countries during the GATS negotiations, and which will re­
main contentious in the future. Indeed, because of how difficult it is to ac­
commodate such trade-offs in the domestic polities of the OECD countries, it 
would not be entirely surprising if a second "ontological revolution" were to 
occur somewhere down the road, this time tying services more closely to the 
realm of investment policy rather than trade.




























































































Finally, one suspects that service-related conflicts will be higher in the Asia- 
Pacific area, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, than elsewhere among the industrial­
ized countries. Regulatory environments are more opaque there, inviting the 
imputation of worst-case motivations. And if past experience from the diffi­
culties encountered in the areas of direct foreign investment and patent pro­
tection is any guide, then in Japan, at any rate, the efficacy of institutional so­
lutions like die right of establishment may prove elusive and generate as many 
bilateral disputes as they resolve.149
Thus, the expansion of traded services reinforces the trend toward intermin­
gling domestic and international issues and processes, as well as contesting do­
mestic domains, as central elements of international economic policymaking. 
The GATS represents an important first step, but little more, in providing 
some degree of order to how the consequences are managed.
Welfare Capitalism
In the autumn of 1993, the editors of the Economist thought they detected -  
and they vigorously applauded -  a new grand economic strategy on the part of 
the Clinton administration, offering Americans what the journal described as a 
new deal. "Its outlines are simple: you accept change (such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement) and we'll help to give you security" -  occu­
pational, health care, and personal security.150 The Financial Times later that 
year, even while editorially basking in "the most capitalist Christmas in his­
tory," reflected on the pressing need for a new deal for the entire capitalist 
world:
The world is changing rapidly; the Atlantic nations in general and Europe in 
particular face competition from the younger, harsher, more robust capitalism 
of south Asia. ... Even the middle classes, who have benefited most from 
economic growth, fear that they may lose what they have, while those out­
149 The most egregious patent case, of course, concerns the integrated circuit Texas 
Instruments, its inventor, applied for a patent in Japan on February 6, 1960; it was 
granted effective October 30, 1989, by which time Japanese firms accounted for nearly 
all sales in Japan and large chunks of the world market Thomas C. Hayes, "Japan Grip 
Still Seen On Patents,” New York Times, November 24, 1989; and David E. Sanger, 
"Contrasts on Chips," New York Times, January 18, 1990. More recently, U.S. firms, 
including Texas Instruments, have brought successful suits against Japanese firms for 
past infringements of intellectual property rights. "When copying gets costly," The 
Economist, May 9, 1992. Moreover, both the World Intellectual Property Organization 
and the WTO plan to take a more active role in harmonizing patent systems among the 
U.S., Europe, and Japan.




























































































side note that however rich the super-rich may get, large-scale unemployment 
persists. Lower down the income scale the picture is far worse.... If welfare 
capitalism is to be sustained, its managers must find new means of control­
ling its cost, and minimising the cost to employers. Radical policies, centred 
around the notion of giving the poor a hand-up rather than a hand-out must 
be pursued.151
These two British newspapers are among the most irrepressible and articu­
late advocates anywhere of free markets and free trade. What, then, possessed 
them to worry about the economic security of workers and sustaining welfare 
capitalism -  and, even more curiously, to suggest that governments have a role 
to play in achieving those objectives? The answer is really quite simple. Both 
realize that the extraordinary success of postwar international liberalization 
has hinged on a domestic social compact between the state and society. Both 
see that this social compact is everywhere fraying. And both fear that if it un­
ravels altogether, so too will liberalization.
Social expenditures began to rise rapidly in the OECD countries in the 
1960s, and now average roughly one-third of GDP. But contrary to 
widespread misconceptions in the United States, these expenditures leveled off 
some time ago. In the U.S. they nearly doubled from roughly ten percent of 
GDP in 1960 to just under nineteen in 1975. But they peaked there, and by 
1985 had drifted lower than a decade before. Indeed, in 1985 only Spain and 
Japan devoted a smaller share of GDP to social expenditures than the United 
States.152 On the other hand, the U.S. economy has generated far more jobs 
than any other in the OECD for the past two decades, though the uniformity of 
their quality is in dispute and long-term unemployment has increased.153
In Western Europe, the social safety net has held up more firmly than in the 
U.S., but at the cost of eroding competitiveness and an anemic rate of job cre­
ation. Production costs are among the highest in the world, thanks to generous 
benefits and high payroll taxes, and the work force is immobile and inflexible. 
As a result, unemployment is at a postwar high, averaging eleven percent. The 
situation is far worse in Eastern Europe. It remains masked in Japan by the
151 "Capitalism at Christmas," Financial Times, December 24, 1993, p. 6.
152 OECD, The Future o f Social Protection (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 1988), Table 1, p. 10.
153 As the senior economist of the National Association of Manufacturers -  which is not 
usually closely allied with labor -  recendy stated: "There are large numbers of temporary, 
part-time and contract workers out there who are counted as employed but are in reality 
competing for permanent jobs... There are enormous amounts of disguised slack in the 
labor market." Cited in Louis Uchitelle, "A Matter of Timing -  Debate on the Fed's Latest 





























































































employment practices of firms, but is a latent threat.154 15Surveying these 
trends, Paul McCracken, who chaired President Nixon's Council of Economic 
Advisers, recently reached a somber conclusion in the Wall Street Journal: 
"Those entering the work forces in Western Europe and even in the U.S. con­
front labor market conditions more nearly resembling those of the late 1930s 
than those prevailing during the four decades or so following World War 
n ."155
Budget deficits and tax-averse publics make it impossible for govern-ments 
to expand the web of social policies that have characterized welfare capitalism 
since World War II. Even for the most social democratic and neocorporatist 
welfare states, the costs have become unsustainable. Moreover, there is a 
growing sense that some of these policies have become part of the problem, 
not the solution, due not only to their financial burden but also because many 
are perceived not to work well any longer and even to create perverse disin­
centives. U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich reflected a growing consensus in 
proposing recently that several job-related social programs be terminated: 
"Investing scarce resources in programs that don't deliver cheats workers who 
require results and taxpayers who finance failure."156
Efforts to radically overhaul the capitalist welfare state cannot focus only on 
retrenchment, however, if the project of international liberalization is to re­
main domestically viable. To succeed, these efforts must "review and re­
design," not merely "slash and trash," in the words of Lloyd Axworthy, 
Canada's Liberal Minister of Human Resources.157 Kenneth Clarke, Britain's 
Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, echoes the sentiment: "I intend," he said at 
the outset of a recent speech, "to extol the virtues of both a flexible labour 
market and a strong welfare state. ... I believe that, properly directed, the two 
complement one another."158 And President Clinton warned the allies at the 
NATO summit in January 1994 that unless the United States, Europe, and 
Japan create greater economic and social opportunities at home, "it will be
154 See Ferdinand Protzman, "Rewriting the Contract for Germany's Vaunted Workers," 
New York Times, February 13, 1994; "Europe and the Underclass," The Economist, 
July 30, 1994; Steve Coll, "Economic Change, Social Upheaval," Washington Post, 
August 7, 1994, pp. Al, A24; and Drozdiak, "New Global Markets Mean Grim Trade- 
Offs."
155 Paul McCracken, "Costlier Labor, Fewer Jobs, Unemployment -  The Crisis Continues, 
Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1994, p. A10.
156 Cited in Swoboda, "Reich Targets Several Job Programs," p. Al.
157 Cited in Geoffrey York, "Grits vow radical social reform," Globe and Mail (Toronto), 
February 1, 1994, p. A7.




























































































difficult for the people of... all our nations to continue to support [a] policy of 
involvement with the rest of the world."159
And so, the compromise of embedded liberalism has come around full cir­
cle. Governments once again are groping to find a mutually compatible set of 
policies for international and domestic stabilization. But they are doing so in 
an institutional context wherein little remains the same but an implicit norma­
tive commitment to sustain both, and in an international political environment 
in which their common enemy is not a clear and present geopolitical threat but 
more diffuse fears of the consequences of policy failure.
Conclusion
When all is said and done, I concur with the assessment of David Gordon, 
the well-known radical economist, that "we have been witnessing the decay of 
the postwar global economy rather than the construction of a fundamentally 
new and enduring system of production and exchange."160 My reasoning, 
however, is not driven by any inherent contradictions in the laws of capitalist 
development. It draws instead on the core insight of Carr and Polanyi that no 
system of production and exchange can long endure in the modem world un­
less it is embedded in a framework of political legitimacy that can derive only 
from its responsiveness to shared social purposes.
The new world economy that has emerged over the past few decades poses 
far greater challenges to governments than the traditional stabilization issues 
discussed in the previous section precisely because it is disembedded in several 
key dimensions. The first is in its policy templates: the mental maps of spaces 
and structures with which policymakers visualize the basic contours of their 
world. These have been severely strained and even left behind by the break­
down in the distinction between domestic and international policy realms; the 
shift from markets to hierarchies and alliances as core forms in the global or­
ganization of production and exchange; and the growing role of the ontologi- 
cally ambiguous transactions called traded services. The second and related 
source of disembeddedness is the world of policymaking itself. International as 
well as domestic economic policy targets are increasingly elusive because in­
strumentalities are no longer as effective. This ineffectiveness, in turn, reflects 
the fact that the theoretical, conceptual, and statistical infrastructure of policy 
too often still reflects previous policy templates and the cause-effect relations 
that pertained in that earlier world. Lastly, the new world economy is increas­
159 Cited in E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Europe’s Preoccupation,” Washington Post, January 11, 
1994, p. A ll.




























































































ingly disembedded from the domestic social compact between state and society 
on which the political viability of the postwar international economic order 
hinged. Policy attitudes toward the new world economy have shifted in the di­
rection of neoliberalism to an extent that is beginning to be of concern even to 
staunch guardians of market orthodoxies in the leading financial journals of 
Britain and the United States. Slowly, policymakers are rediscovering the or­
ganic link between domestic social and economic security on the one hand, and 
the durability of international systems of production and exchange, on the 
other.
Constructing the 1995 analogue to the 1945 embedded liberalism compro­
mise, needless to say, is a herculean task. Last time around, the most decisive 
negotiations took place between two countries, the United States and Great 
Britain, with Canada at times mediating between the two of them -  and on 
other occasions between the U.S. State Department and Treasury. This time, 
because of the diffusion of economic power but also due to the nature of the 
issues themselves, the relevant parties must include all leading capitalist na­
tions, in many cases the newly industrializing countries, and in some instances 
members of the poorer developing world. What is more, last time around 
there was widespread consensus about what needed to be done and how to do it 
in the professional circles on whose work policymakers drew -  in the relevant 
"epistemic communities," as I have called them elsewhere.161 Today, it seems 
more appropriate to speak of epistemic disarray in the community of scholars 
and policy analysts. Finally, the overall international geostrategic situation is 
very different today. That does not make agreement impossible, but it requires 
more precise quids-pro-quos to be devised. In sum, it is exceedingly unlikely 
that any new grand bargain can be forged except in the most general of terms. 
At best, therefore, we are likely to see a series of overall normative frame­
work agreements coupled with their specific operationalization in specific 
sectors, based on varying levels of commitments, made by shifting groups of 
countries. Making sure that these more minilateral and plurilateral schemes 
remain compatible with the animating principles of multilateralism remains 
perhaps the toughest challenge of all.
161 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," 
International Organization, 29 (Summer 1975), esp. pp. 569-570. For an elaborate 
application to the postwar economic negotiations, see G. John Ikenberry, "A World 
Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement," 
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